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My interest is in recording my observations and opinions during the performance of my counter narcotics employment. The viewpoints are my own. It is specifically intended that this blog shall contain no information that is privileged or confidential. If anyone discovers anything herein that they beleive is privileged or confidential please bring it to my attention. Nothing herein may be republished without permission and attribution.



Updated each Friday (more or less)

Sunday, April 25, 2010

Late Post -- Thailand Red Shirt Crisis -- end of CNAT

The past couple weeks have been hectic. I just could not seem to get around to posting this. Yesterday, I was informed that the State Department has cancelled the contract that I am working under – as of the end of June. Actually, they have decided not to extend the “temporary” work order under which we have been functioning. CPI has never had a proper contract – just performing under a repeatedly extended work order for the past two years or so. The work order has been extended every few months with a promise that a proper contract will be awarded down the line. They, apparently, have decided to simply scrap the CNAT program. Meanwhile, CPI is bidding on some other Afghan contracts. If they are awarded one that contains a position for which I am qualified, I hope to be able to just slide into the new position. This, however, is speculation on my part. I am returning to Kabul tomorrow (Monday) from Thailand, and I will find out then if I have any options. It could be that I will simply have worked for only four months – not nearly enough time to buy the Gulfstream executive jet that I’ve had my heart set on.


Back to the past two weeks:

Please try to read the Time magazine article last week about the problems a US Army company has had in just trying to reopen an Afghan school. It is illustrative of the bureaucratic and other troubles that occur with many, probably most, of the potential aid projects in Afghanistan. It demonstrates that the Afghan citizens have to deal with the reality that America and her allies may not have eliminated the Taliban nor have trained an effective security force before they leave. See: www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1982093,00.html

Acquiring an airline ticket in Afghanistan has proven to be an ordeal. Not the acquisition itself, but having any choice of itinerary or seating. I tried two different travel agencies and discovered that it is pretty much a one choice take it or leave it proposition. If you inquire about alternative itineraries it turns into a situation where what you were offered gets cancelled with no other options having been offered. Ask about a seat assignment and you are informed that you will be allotted a seat at the airport. Push the issue and you may lose your reservation. Once you have a reservation number, you can call the airline and they will assign you a seat, but you will likely have to pay (cash) for the ticket before you get a reservation number. The only good thing about the process is that they can get you a significantly better fare than you can find on the internet.

I was deposited into Bangkok at the height (so far) of the Thailand Red Shirt political crisis. There were nearly 30 people killed at a demonstration that got out of control a couple weeks ago and, the day before I arrived, an RPG was fired into a Sky Train station killing a bystander. A couple days ago the Red Shirts stormed the Chulalongkorn University Hospital searching for someone. Today there is a cabinet meeting at which the government will discuss the imposition of martial law. The Red Shirts are supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1108114.stm
Thaksin is now a self-exiled, felony-convicted fugitive billionaire who is providing financial support to the Red Shirts and whipping them up with big-screen televised speeches at their rallies. He is a talented and chiasmatic politician that the poor and rural people see as the only political leader who has instituted political measures specifically to help them. He instituted some long overdue and needed populist reforms (which some opponent see as a step toward Communism). The fact that he moved political corruption and self benefit to a level that was previously unimaginable, seems to make little difference to his supporters. “Sure he is a crook, but they are all crooks – and he is the only crook that helped make my life better” seems to be the attitude.

Thaksin was ousted by a military coup about three and a half years ago. The military proved to be inept at governing and relinquished control a year or so ago to what has evolved into the present government. This present government is, however, is widely regarded as being manipulated by the military and, though the Prime Minister seems to be regarded as non-corrupt, his administration appears to me to be populated by ineffective and dishonest bureaucrats. The Hmong debacle four months ago provides a good example that I am familiar with:

 No one doubts that the vast majority of the 4500 or so Hmong that were repatriated to Laos were “economic” migrants just seeking a better life, but it is a clear fact that, among this large group, there were a substantial number of what has come to be called the “Jungle Hmong” who’s repatriation would subject them to almost certain harsh treatment, likely torture, and possible execution. Instead of just sorting the Jungle Hmong from the rest – a classification task that had already pretty much been done by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Thai military screeners – the Thai government separated the potential leaders from the large group but delivered everyone across the Mekong to the Lao authorities. Meanwhile, the Prime and the Foreign Minister blatantly and repeatedly told the public that:

1. The repatriation was voluntary,

2. All the refugees were of an economic nature, and

3. That there was an intergovernmental agreement that would guarantee good treatment of the refugees by the Lao officials (the specific terms of this “agreement” were A. never disclosed, B. were, apparently, never reduced to writing, and C. have no provisions for monitoring and/or verification. I can find no record of any other non defense related agreement between governments that has these characteristics). It seems evident that the “agreement” was (if it even ever existed) a vague verbal understanding between officials that, if they even had the authority, never bothered to do what is customary to move the understanding beyond a conjectural possibility.  None of these items, presented by the government officals were true.

The bottom line is that the present Thai government was blatantly dishonest about this particular issue that I care about, so it is reasonable to suspect that they have behaved in a similarly unscrupulous manner on other issues.  That is my personal assessment of the present governmental situation, based on this one specific issue that interests me as well as my general observation of ineptitude.  As I write this, the present government is asserting that some leaders of the Red Shirts are anti Monarchist. If there is any one thing that almost all Thais feel strongly about it is their common love for this King. Any believed suggestion of an anti Monarchist sentiment is likely to provoke large numbers of Thai citizens to blind outrage. This was proven in the fall of 1976 when dozens of Thai students were slaughtered by a group of Thai citizens who (erroneously) believed those students to be against the King. Based on the observations related above, you can likely guess that I am skeptical about these present charges.

A little more than a year ago, it was the Yellow Shirt group that demonstrated and shut down the BKK airport. They are the group that, generally, support the present government and are staunchly anti Thaksin. Last week a Multi Colored Shirt group was formed and held a couple large rallies to protest the disruption and economic harm that the other two main groups are causing. Everyone hopes that this lovely country and it’s delightful people can find a way to come together. Presently, however, it appears that the two main factions are becoming more hard-nosed and more militant. 

Last week the US Embassy hosted a town hall meeting to give advice about the situation. The advice they had was good even if, mostly, self evident. 1. Stay way from the demonstration areas, 2. Remember that you are not the target of the protests, 3. If you find yourself in a demonstration, be polite and move away from it, and 4. Have 72 hours of provisions and water at home in case you become isolated (good general advice in case of hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. too).

The Ambassador was charming and answered questions for about 40 minutes. One young man who sad he was a professional photographer who visits the Red Shirt area every day said the numbers of the Red Shirts are vastly underestimated. He asserted that the official estimation of 50,000 in the area is low by a factor of three or four. The Ambassador was skeptical. He said they are paying close attention and believe the official estimate is accurate.

After the formal meeting ended, the Ambassador was asked if anyone at the Embassy knows what has become of the heads of the families of the former US allies, the repatriated Jungle Hmong group. He seemed mildly surprised by the question and quickly stated something about not being able to talk about some things, but that the Embassy is monitoring the situation. He said they have learned that one cannot believe what the Laos say (what a startling revelation that must have been!). My prediction is that the Jungle Hmong adult males have already been “disappeared.” If there is ever any Lao statement about them it will be that they escaped back to the jungle. The rest will be disbursed around the country, Thailand will receive the bulk of the upcoming Lao hydroelectric kilowatts and investment benefits, and our US State Department will suck up to the Communist so as to expand the Lao American Embassy staff.

That’s it for now. Back to Kabul tomorrow, via Delhi. I’m anxious to see if I have a future employment possibility beyond the next two months and what the next two months will present as we shut down the program. It will be potentially devastating news for the Afghan CNAT team members and the Security team to learn that their program is ending – along with their jobs.

Friday, April 16, 2010

A Training Day and Mike Spann's death site

Since the team leader was in Kabul, here was no staff meeting Saturday. By Monday he had returned and I instructed an Introduction to Project Management Class that day. The entire CNAT team attended. The morning went very well, and the team members seemed to be enthusiastic, particapative, and receptive. After lunch, it still proceeded fairly well, but there was evidence of sleepiness and somewhat less attention. Aggravating this was the fact that the class really needed another four or five hours. The afternoon, therefore, consisted of more lecture and less participation, in an attempt to introduce all the material. Maybe we can follow up at a later date.  The picture to the right is the CNAT team on our training day.

The weather has been nice. One hot day – up to 105 F, but mostly comfortable and clear. There is never-ending dust in the air. It looks like mild smog, but it is dust. A thin layer on everything.

We still cannot do field trips because of not having a reliable second vehichle. DynCorp loaned us a tire to replace the one that blew out a couple weeks ago, but the F-250 is so junky that the Security chief does not want to take it out of town.

I visited the Quala-i-Jangi fortress where Mike Spann was killed. Mike was a CIA employee who was the first American killed in what became the Afghan war. The Mike Spann Army base is located near the site of his death. The events associated with his death occured in late November of 2001. The Taliban had been pretty well defeated in this area by the Northern Alliance. You will remember that Ahmad Shah Massoud, the legendary leader of the Northern Alliance, had been assassinate by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists just two days before the 9/11 attack. His successor, Gen. Dostum, in late November, negotiated a deal with the defeated Taliban. The agreement was that, if the Taliban would surrender their weapons, the Afghan Taliban would be allowed to go to their homes. There were, however, several hundred foreign national Taliban. Apparently Gen. Dostum’s staff and the Afghan Taliban leaders agreed to make it seem that the agreement applied to Taliban generally, though it was never intended that the foreign nationals would be allowed to leave, at least not until after they has been interviewed about Al Qaeda. During the disarmament, some of the foreign nationals, probably smelling a rat, secreted grenades and, possibly, some hand guns in their clothing. This group of several hundred foreign Taliban were transported to the fortress.

The fortress was build back in the late 1800's. It is massive. It probably measures 300 - 400 yards on each side. It consists of a wall around 30 feet high and 30 feet thick and is divided, more or less in half, by a another wall running East and West. The Northern half contains General Dostum’s headquarters and his residence. The Southern half, containing a few buildings which included an armory, became a makeshift prison for the foreign Taliban. The Taliban disarmament occurred on Nov. 24th and some of the Taliban were moved to the fortress that day. The rest followed on the 25th. Some of the prisoners were put in a building near the center of this compound, but most of them were seated in the open field area. Some, but not all had their hands bound. There were only a few guards, and the oversight of the prisoners was not well organized. On the 25th Spann and another CIA agent began interviewing the prisoners, one of which was the infamous “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh. The interviewing had gone on for a while when one of the prisoners blew himself and a guard up with a grenade. This triggered a general uprising which included Spann being attacked by the prisoners near him. There were some journalists and medical personnel in the compound along with the few guards, Spann, and the other CIA operative. Spann stood his ground and fought with an AK-47, then a pistol, then his fists while the others fought a retreat action through the gate into the North half of the fortress. Most who have studied the action believe that the others would likely not have made it except for Spann’s standing his ground. He was eventually overwhelmed and beaten to death. All the other friendly foreigners made it out.

Once the others were out, the few Taliban who made it through the gate killed or captured, and the gate secured, the Taliban were effectively contained within the walls of the southern half of the fortress. There were somewhere between 300 and 500 of them – probably closer to 300. What followed was an embarrassing series of events which continued for six days. These events began with an attempt to drop a “smart bomb” on the armory so as to deny it’s armaments to the prisoners. With the assistance of about four laser target designators from four different locations around the fortress, the 500 pound smart bomb missed the armory building by at least 100 yards. Apparently there were two or three more smart bombs deployed which missed by equally embarrassing margins. Meanwhile the friendlies are bringing more troops and more equipment to the walls of the fortress. Somewhere along the line they even get a tank up on one of the ramparts and it begins firing into the compound. Having the Taliban in a “fish in a barrel” situation, the good guys offered the bad guys a chance to give up. They refused. Soon the bad guys discover the armory and become well-armed fish in a barrel. For the next few days the strategy alternated between trying to kill them and trying to get them to surrender. Little by little the Taliban are driven from the compound into the largest of the buildings which contains a basement (where some of them had been held prisoner back on day one). Now the tank was blasting at the building, bombs continued to be dropped with little effect, and dozens (maybe hundreds of soldiers were blazing away at the building and the few Taliban that show themselves. Thinking, I guess, that a 2000 pound bomb would be smarter than the 500 pounders, the Air Force drops one of those huge bunker-buster monsters on the building into which most of the Taliban had now retreated. It produce an explosion like noone had ever seen or heard. It proved, however, to be even dumber than the five hundred pound variety. Not only did it miss the targeted building, but it hit the friendly tank – destroying it and killing several soldiers.

By the third day, all the surviving Taliban were in the basement of the building, but they still refused to surrender. We tried shooting into the building, dropping grenades through the basement windows, and bombing it. Most of the bombs missed and the few that did hit the building did not penetrate into the basement. We pored a large quantity of diesel fuel and gasoline though the windows and threw in a match. Apparently too much diesel and not enough gas – it burned but did not explode. No one comes out. On the fourth day, the General had the water from an irrigation canal diverted into the basement. No one came out. After several hours, thinking all are drowned, the solders cautiously started to enter. They were met with a grenade and gunfire. They kept the water flowing and, on the sixth day, the third day of flooding, the Taliban gave up. Eighty seven men finally emerged. One of them was John Walker Lindh who was later sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The Southern compound has not been repaired. All the buildings are a mass of bullet marks and explosive damage. It is a little grown over with brush and weeds. There is, however, a nice memorial to Mike Spann on or very near the place where he died.
Above is my security crew ready to take me to the office.  I live in the CONEX over my left sholder.

Friday, April 9, 2010

Still in Mazar -- My Fitness Test

A late report: While in Kabul, I had to take the CPI Physical Agility Test. This will give you an idea of why we IA’s may be the first group called on to back up the Recon Marines, Delta Force, or the Seals. Here is the test:

1. Walk a quarter mile in 10 minutes or less,

2. Walk up and down a 10-step minimum staircase,

3. Lift/press 20 pounds over head, and

4. (this is the one that really separates the athletes from the couch potatoes) Walk 50 feet carrying 20 pounds of additional weight.

Fortunately, I have been carrying at least 40 pounds of additional weight for many years, so I was able to make it through number four with only mild exhaustion. I just hope they don’t up the distance to 60 feet. Anyway, I passed. It may have helped that I was able to take a nap between number one and number two.

This week I readied the training materials for the Introduction to Project Management training. Late in the week we decided to do the training in one day – a “training day” – next Monday.

I was unable to take any field trips because we have no spare tire for the junky F-250. They had sent one from Kabul which proved to have a big unreparable hole in it. I have eight armed men to protect me and small housing complex to house them. There are two “hard” vehicles required for all movements. But, with all this in-place expense, it is necessary to use an abandoned F-250 as the second car (the original was wrecked a couple years ago) and we cannot find enough money to buy a tire for it. In this same vein, some of the site security chiefs are buying ammunition with their own money with which to train the guards.

There are a number of Counter Narcotics Assistance Team (CNAT) related things going on in Balkh Province. Since Balkh Province is virtually poppy free, most of the projects have to do with Public Information, Gender Affairs, and Alternative Livelihoods. Monitoring and Verification are ongoing, of course, but they are more routine. I will mention a few recent programs that seem to be forward looking and promising.

 The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently distributed 30,000 baby chicks to about 1,000 vulnerable women in the two of the districts of Balkh Province. The term “vulnerable” is not well defined, but the intent is that the women be in need of assistance and livelihood support. The Balkh CNAT proposes to augment this, and future, chicken projects with Colombo Plan add-on training for the care, feeding, and medicating of the chickens. The FAO has voice support for this effort.

.The Balkh Agriculture Directorate has recently distributed 2,500,000 saplings (both fruit and non-fruit) to the farmers of all Balkh districts. These saplings will provide alternative livelihood possibilities and will also help reduce soil erosion, regenerate oxygen, improve water retention, and promote a “greening” of the Balkh Province for a better environment. CNAT has been active at these distributions with counter narcotic messages and messages of support for the concept.

.The FAO, in cooperation with the Balkh Forestry Department, is in the process of establishing two pistachio plantations. These plantations will provide research data about the successful development of a pistachio industry in the area. There are obvious alternative livelihood possibilities here, and the plantations may also provide some rehabilitative employment for drug addicts. The head of the Forestry Department has voiced support for CNAT projects and involvement.

.There are a number of other project progressing in which CNAT has various degrees of participation.

.The FAO is distributing several species of animal semen to the local Vetenarians and educating the Balkh farmers about its use to upgrade the quality of the local livestock. The CNAT attends the seminars to give support and get it’s message out.

.There is an ongoing rug weaving training program that provides alternative livelihood as well as rehabilitive employment.

.The CNAT team participates in events such as the recent canal cleaning project in Dedade district and the Afghan New Year festivities to promote the counter narcotic messages.

.There has been $20,000 allocated to Balkh Province CNAT for PI purposes. The CNAT team is studying how to best use it taking into account the Governor’s objectives and how to maximize effectiveness.

I have submitted a recommendation that CPI revisit the policy about arming the AIs. Some of us already have more firearms training and experience than the sum of our Afghan security guards, and it is not particularly difficult to qualify a novice – if someone cannot qualify or does not want to, nothing is lost. With almost every expat here at the Regional Training Center (RTC) being armed (both inside and outside the wire), one wonders why the divergence of US policy.

There is one other small expatriate group here at the RTC that is also not armed. They are the Justice System Support Team – lawyers helping establish a modern criminal justice system – also a State Department project. I have been told that, in a firefight, they are not even allowed to pick up a downed guard’s weapon and use it to defend themselves. Someone actually said that with a straight face. There are clearly some DofS policy makers that are well qualified to work in the financial industry (see the mortgage fiasco last week).

That’s it for this week. It seems like about 90% of my past two weeks writing has been bitching. Oh, well. Maybe I need some R&R – I’m due in another 10 days or so.

Friday, April 2, 2010

Slow week in Mazur and the Mortgage mess

I have learned that the Buzkachi season is over – no more games at the stadium down the road. The match that I viewed from our guard tower may have been the last one of the year.

Saturday I attended the CNAT staff meeting.  They do not use the progress slides for the past week and the next week’s preview slides that the Jalalabad team uses.  Also, they did not pause for translation.  It was therefor, not easy for me to follow what was happening.  Each team member talked about their projects, and the interpreter translated what they were saying at my ear. It was very difficult to understand.  The fact that my hearing aid amplifies the person speaking as much (or more) that the mutterings of the translator does not help.

The CNAT offices are in town.  I estimate they are three or four miles from the RTC where I stay.  The team leader and the translator both recommend that I not come in every day.  I plan, therefor, to go there about three times a week. Sat. for the staff meeting for sure and two or three other days.

The building contractors here do not put "goose neck" water traps in the sink, floor, and shower drains.  The sewer gasses waft up into the bathroom.  Not a good idea.  The only worse idea is turning on the electric vent fan and closing the door so as to get rid of the smell.

I have learned that several of the team members are not computer literate.  Also, the team’s annual plan just consists of a rewording of their statement of work,  No details as to how they plan to fulfill the broad objectives, etc.  Wednesday, I proposed to the team leader that I teach a project management class.  He thought it was a good idea.  I can introduce some fundamental planning concepts and tools in the course of a very basic project management course.  I expect that I can give them enough to be useful in about three or four two hour sessions.  It is difficult to estimate because of the language thing.  I will prepare some materials and take them to the translator at the Saturday staff meeting.

This has been a slow week.  I have been occupied, though, with completing a refinance loan on my FL condo.  It has been a night mare.  I do not know how they stay in business.  Six months to complete.  One silly repetitive mistaken thing after another.  It deserves to be talked about. I’ll chronicle the miserable experience this weekend and add it to this posting.

The Mortgage Mess has been moved to it's own page at the upper left of the blog