YAAAHOOO! (I think). Well I think I finally stumbled on it -- a way to put a tab on the blog page that allows anyone interested to be notified when I post an update (which is now not frequently, sorry to say). It was there all along (of course) under the "add a gadget" link. The tab(s) is now on the left side of the blog. I thank those who tried to help me over the past couple weeks. The problem I was having is that I am barely into the digital age and I do not understand the terminology. I do not know what terms like "feed burner, RSS, podcast, blogger feed, feed reader, and chicklet" mean. When I look the terms up, they are explained with other words that I do not understand -- it is like another language.
My next problem is finding a way to have a separate page or slide show of pictures. I have a small album of pictures from Afghanistan that I'd like to post but, so far, I can't find a way to do so. There is another "gadget" that allows me to post a slide show. It requires me, however, to enter the "URL" of the slide show and, having looked up URL, I have no idea how to get one for my pictures. I will, however, continue to play with it.
Meanwhile, my comment about having a discussion about torture has elicited no comments whatsoever. I may write an essay about it anyway. Here are a couple more topics that I think deserves some discussion:
1. Profiling. Law enforcement officers are supposed to be trained to notice things that might indicate criminal activity. If they notice that a very high percentage of the narcotics seizures on I95 have been from rental cars driven by young African American men, why is it a bad thing to pay extra attention to rental cars driven by young African American men?
2. Executive compensation: Thirty years ago Fortune Five executives were paid 35 - 40 times the compensation of production workers. Now it is 300 - 400 times production worker earnings. How is it anti-business to think that this morally, economically, and philosophically unjustifiable.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Update
I apologize for neglecting my updates. There should be a way to notify interested persons when a new post is published (so you don't have to come to an empty site), but I have been unable to find one. I just spent another 45 minutes researching the topic and came up with this: "use Feedburner to manage the subscriptions. Blogger automatically comes with an RSS feed provider - just get them to click on the envelope on the screen and give their email address. They'll then be sent all new posts done by you." I have no idea, however, what it means and/or how to use it. If anyone reading this uses it and can explain it, please comment.
I am still pursuing the possibility of going back to Afghanistan, but I have nothing concrete yet. If it happens, I'll continue the reporting of that venture. If not, I may just close the blog. Alternatively, I think it might be interesting to present some opinions for debate -- there are a number of popular attitudes and opinions that I just cannot relate go. I can not, for example, understand why so many persons believe that it is a morally superior position to allow friends and fellow citizens to vaporize or die of Ebola rather that to water board a scumbag into disclosing the location of a terror device. Anyway, let me sort things out, and I'll try to get the posts going again soon.
The situation is Thailand is calm, but the underlying problems are still there.
I am still pursuing the possibility of going back to Afghanistan, but I have nothing concrete yet. If it happens, I'll continue the reporting of that venture. If not, I may just close the blog. Alternatively, I think it might be interesting to present some opinions for debate -- there are a number of popular attitudes and opinions that I just cannot relate go. I can not, for example, understand why so many persons believe that it is a morally superior position to allow friends and fellow citizens to vaporize or die of Ebola rather that to water board a scumbag into disclosing the location of a terror device. Anyway, let me sort things out, and I'll try to get the posts going again soon.
The situation is Thailand is calm, but the underlying problems are still there.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Afghan Closeout Report
The James Stent piece has generated more interest by far than anything else I have provided over the past five months. I will try to follow up but, sorry to say, I don’t know much about Mr. Stent except that the email I received that contained his piece said he was a long time Thai resident. I have no idea how to contact him. I do, however, have some news about him -- provided today by Andrew Dover in a comment to that part of this blog: http://www.zoominfo.com/people/Stent_James_61720833.aspx Mr Dover has provided links to other writings about the Thai situation too. Take a look.
Meanwhile, it appears that my stint in Afghanistan has come to an end. I was very hopeful that, by reactivating my law license, I would get picked up for the JSSP program (administered by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)). I knew that they have applicants who have serious experience as prosecutors, defense attorneys and, even, judges. I hoped, however, that the fact that I had worked in Afghanistan might be a strong enough factor to make me a candidate. Apparently not – they have my application, but no one has contacted me.
As a kind of close-out of the Afghanistan venture, I will answer some of the questions that have come up about what I saw there and/or think about the situation.
1. Are we winning? I am not optimistic. Winning would mean making large Afghan areas secure and leaving them an a way that the Afghans could keep secure. This war is being fought in a new way that now focuses (more than ever before) on avoiding civilian casualties above all else. The Brits, Canadians, and Americans are the only forces that, more or less, want to fight, and they are approaching the enemy in a very mild manner. The rules of engagement (ROE) have evolved to the point that there is actually a policy directive ordering troops to patrol only in areas where they are reasonably sure they will not contact the enemy (see my McChrystal comments below). There is widespread dissatisfaction among the troops with the ROE and with the progress of the war generally. If this new approach were resulting in security, I might have some hope but, as far as I can see, it is not. We are not killing very many Talaban nor disrupting them in a way that leaves them ineffective. There are not very many Afghans that want the Talaban to be in control, but they have little confidence that we will make them secure. They believe that, when we leave, the Taliban will still be there and that they will be vengeful toward those who were too enthusiastic about supporting us. They are trying to accept our aid in a way that the Talaban approve. Getting approval for aid projects from the Tanaban leadership, paying a percentage of the salaries they receive for working on aid projects to the Talaban, etc. We are training a large number of police and soldiers, but the trainers I talked to are not very confident of their readiness or commitment. Our attempt to get the Afghans ready to provide their own security seems neither efficient or effective. Overlaying the whole problem is our reliance on a central government that is corrupt and ineffective. Here and there is a success story (see my piece a few weeks ago about Balkh Province poppy cultivation success which applies to their security success as well), but those success stories seem to me to be little headed. Mostly it appears to me to be a frantic attempt to buy an effective government and security force in a short time. My sense is that we might have them ready to car for themselves in three or four years – by next summer, no hope.
2. How much do contractors get paid? This varies quite a bit. They start with a base salary that seems to be close to what the same job might be paid in the US at the Federal level and they add 35% danger pay for the days in Afghanistan and another 35% post deferential pay (a kind of hardship bonus) which continues unless you are out of country for a certain time during the contract (mine was 30 continuous days). They also add a 10% contract bonus if you finish the years contract and (at least in my case) a bit of money to defray travel expense for the R&R type leave you get (usually about two weeks R&R after about eight weeks work. All these add ons boost the pay about 80% above the base pay. It is a sum that can never be achieved (because you will never have been in country for all 365 days) but it is, for some reason the amount that every one talks about. My pay was typical for mentor or advisor and the amount was roughly ($96,000 base). The Border Patrol training position that I was offered with a different company paid $134,000 (including add ons), The lawyers in the Justice System Support Program are working from a base of around $110,000 which puts the total possible compensation around $200,000. The aviators are compensated a little differently. They get approximately $600 - $700 per day, and the ones I know about work in country for about 60 days with compensation and then have about 30 days off without pay. This puts their annual compensation up around $155,000 with about 4 months off. I think they can choose to work more, but I’m not sure. Meanwhile what I would call project managers are paid around $210,000 total with add ons. I assume that program managers that oversee several projects are 10% or so north of that figure. One of the attractive features of all these contractor positions is the fact that lodging and food are furnished at no cost so there is very little in-country expense to the employee, and most of the compensation can be utilized by the employee. In Afghanistan, the contracts are “alcohol free” and, while it is possible to find a place to drink in Kabul, very little money is spent on that kind of entertainment. There is also an income tax break. In that these salaries are paid for services performed outside the USA and it’s territories, there is up to about $90,000 per year that can be excluded from US income tax if the employee qualifies. To qualify, the employee must 1. Be a resident of a foreign country or 2. Be outside the USA for about 330 days of the 365 in which the employment is contained.
3. What’s going on with the McChrystal flap? I just now went back and reread the Rolling Stone article that precipitated the controversy and McChrystal removal. The “Runaway General” article that reportedly demonstrated ’s McChrystal’s disrespect for his civilian bosses. I am still a little puzzled. Maybe I have become jaded, but I can not find anything in the article that would seem to provoke more that a reprimand. Here are the “disrespectful” items (let me know what I missed): 1. McChrystal voiced dismay at having to dine with a French diplomat; 2. Last fall McChrystal said he thought Biden’s strategy was “short sighted;” 3. McChrystal thought Obama was “uncomfortable and intimidated” by a room full of Military flag officers (this was a year or so ago); 4. An aid characterized McChrystal’s meeting with Obama as a ten minute photo op, said Obama knew little about McCheyatal, and stated that McChrystal was disappointed with the meeting (this also was at least eight months ago); 5. McChrystal found the three month wait for Obama’s decision about a troop increase “painful;” 6. McChrystal characterized the Maja military operation (which he constructed and oversaw) as “a bleeding ulcer;” 7. An aid called Jim Jones a “clown.” This is quite serious, but not at all the same as if McChrystal had said it or if it had been said about the president; 7. McChrystal described Holbrooke as “like a wounded animal” and was reluctant to take phone calls from him; 8.McChrystal’s relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry is strained and, to Eikenberry’s dismay, McChrystal did not appoint the Ambassador as the Afghan Viceroy – McChrystal felt “betrayed” by an Eikenberry memo which was critical of the counter insurgency plan; 9. An aid says that, if the American public really paid attention to the war, there would be even less support; 10. The diplomatic community feels that McChrystal has usurped duties that are properly handled by diplomats. This is an overlay for the strained relationship with Eikenberry and Holbrooke. However, McChrystal has the support of the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. That is a really big “however” when you are talking about conducting foreign diplomacy. In sum, the most pronounced problem is that McChrystal is at odds with the involved diplomats, except the one that really counts, the Secretary of State. He has been successful in being the prime mover in US-Afghan diplomatic events. True, he and his aids have said some “bitchy” things about their civilian bosses, but all these have been pretty typical of subordinate’s private remarks in all organizations. The most disrespectfully, in my opinion, being the “clown” remark about Gen. Jones and the dim-witted remarks about the Vice President. I guess, in sum, it is disrespectful, but it seems to me to fall short of insubordination. I certainly is not akin to moving to invade a neighboring country or refusal to follow orders. However it is characterized, it seems to me to provides little support for the headline Runaway General” and none at all for the sub heading asserting his attitude that “...the real enemy [are] the wimps in the White House.” It looks to me as though everyone has taken these two bogus headings as a valid summation of the entire affair without much real analysis. Joe Klien, in Time magazine, calls McChrystal’s gaff as a “crushing indelicacy” and the Bankok Post editor said McChrystal “criticized and even ridiculed President Barack Obama.” I’ll sign on for indelicacy but see nothing crushing about it nor do I see it as ridiculing the President. Different folks see things differently, I guess.
In my view, the article documents, much more clearly, that the counter insurgence policy (called COIN) is not successful in Afghanistan. COIN endeavors to put soldiers throughout the communities so as to disrupt and make ineffective the insurgents while making the every day life of the population secure – a kind of community policing approach with heavier weapons. It also involves help in building the community infrastructure and governmental apparatus. COIN is the brainchild, primarily, of Gen. Petraeus, and it was a part of his success in Iraq. It has always involved a conscious effort to avoid civilian casualties, but COIN, as practiced under McChrystal, has come to be an avoid armed conflict approach as well as an avoid civilian harm approach. It is not uprooting the Taliban nor making the citizens feel secure. The article also discloses that the troops that are implementing this COIN approach in Afghanistan are very unhappy about it. They do not think it is effective and they think it exposes them to purposeless risk. COIN may (or may not) be a faithful reflection of White House philosophy, but it is being conducted by McChrystal, and it is presently not at all successful.
Anyway, that is my take. A very interesting question to me is why McChrystal would ever cause an openly ruthless left wing reporter, who reports for a left wing publication, to have many weeks of close access. This reporter, Michael Hastings, is on the record as regarding his job to be to f..... news sources in the process of getting stories. He is also known to be left leaning and the Rolling Stone is universally regarded as a leftist publication with no real kinship with the military. McChrystal and his staff are smart, alert, and analytical – this story did not happen by mistake. I can not believe that they were blind sided. There is no doubt in my mind that they facilitated the article for some purpose, and I think they absolutely had to have expected a story from this reporter similar to the one they received. They had to expect that any and all conflicts, mistakes, calamities, and failure would be reported. At the same time, they clearly know that the counterinsurgency is not going well, that the diplomats regard McChrystal as overreaching, that McChrystal is regarded as a staunch supporter of Afghan president Karzai (who’s government is widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective), and that these facts would be reported along with whatever else the reporter discovered. The question then becomes, why would McCrystal want this Rolling Stone article to come about? Almost every leader in every organization devises measures to cover, obscure, or explain the kind of things Hastings wrote about. Why would this leader want them publicly aired? What was McChrystal’s objective? I can see two possibilities: 1. He wanted to expose the situation in an attempt to move the policy in a different direction and/or 2. He wanted to extradite himself from a failing situation. A friend of mine thinks McChryatal is “falling on his sword” so as to change policy. That could be -- and, maybe, he did not expect the reaction to be so extreme. A less kind speculation would be that he wants to remove himself from a mess that he cannot clean up without seeming to “quit.” My guess is that it is mostly number 1, but that number 2 provides a background incentive and makes it more palatable. Are there other possibilities?
4. What are the Afghan people like? What I will describe is based on my limited associations – mostly with the CNAT team members and the Afghan security team.
They are pretty much like people everywhere in that they love their families, want to make life better for their children, want to have good jobs, want security, and wish for peace. They are members of a culture with different underlying presumptions and beliefs than ours. They are most comfortable with local government, respectful of their elders, and deferential to their leaders. They welcome individual input to governmental decisions but are not enthusiastic about our concept of Democracy. Once there is a consensus about community policy, they mostly turn in that direction and support the policy. They think it is silly to give the same weight to the opinion (vote) of a criminal, pervert, or moron as to a respected elder. They associate Western Democracy with promiscuity. They are religious and that religion is Islam, but they think the Taliban have become well outside what the Koran teaches. They mostly support education and business opportunity for all, but they think there are clearly different family and community rolls for men and women. Their marriages are almost all arraigned by their parents and other senior family member, and a very high percentage of those marriages are successful.
5. Why was CNAT and CPI thrown on the trash heap so abruptly? I can only give a reasoned speculation.
Remember that CPI was alerted in mid April to expect a contact extension until next February but, about ten days later, was formally notified that the program would shut down in approximately eight weeks. The CNAT program itself was doing what it was designed to do, though the precise criteria against which it would be evaluated were never established – and it did those things very efficiently. Partly because of this lack of clear performance criteria for the program and the personnel therein, a tension had developed between the Dept. of State INL program manager(s) and the CPI leadership, but the program was limping along although there were a few open conflicts.
Here is what I think happened. There is only one event that I am aware of that occurred within, or around, that ten day period between “extend” and “terminate” that could have changed the INL attitude so drastically. That was the establishment of a narcotics usage and rehabilitation study in Balkh province. The senior International Advisor (IA) in Balk (I was the junior IA there) was the prime mover in the formation of this study. He clearly believed it was worthwhile, but it was also in direct contravention of the specific direction of the INL program manger – a reminder of which had been sent by email just a couple weeks before the formation of the study. I do not believe in coincidence, and my speculation is that the INL program manager used this as a kind of loose cannon argument to contend that CPI and CNAT were beyond control and should be shut down.
This is my own conjecture. I have no certain knowledge. But that is the only event that I know of that could have prompted such a drastic change in position. It is a tragedy! The CNAT program should be studied and emulated rather than ended. The CNAT model allowed the funding to bypass most of the corruption fund diversion opportunities that allow so much aid money to be funneled off. It was able to deliver aid projects, as an example, for about 30% of comparable project costs. If CNAT it had been properly established, with clear performance criteria and some SOP's rather than open ended objectives, it could have achieved US counter narcotic policy objectives very precisely, in my humble opinion.
Meanwhile, it appears that my stint in Afghanistan has come to an end. I was very hopeful that, by reactivating my law license, I would get picked up for the JSSP program (administered by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)). I knew that they have applicants who have serious experience as prosecutors, defense attorneys and, even, judges. I hoped, however, that the fact that I had worked in Afghanistan might be a strong enough factor to make me a candidate. Apparently not – they have my application, but no one has contacted me.
As a kind of close-out of the Afghanistan venture, I will answer some of the questions that have come up about what I saw there and/or think about the situation.
1. Are we winning? I am not optimistic. Winning would mean making large Afghan areas secure and leaving them an a way that the Afghans could keep secure. This war is being fought in a new way that now focuses (more than ever before) on avoiding civilian casualties above all else. The Brits, Canadians, and Americans are the only forces that, more or less, want to fight, and they are approaching the enemy in a very mild manner. The rules of engagement (ROE) have evolved to the point that there is actually a policy directive ordering troops to patrol only in areas where they are reasonably sure they will not contact the enemy (see my McChrystal comments below). There is widespread dissatisfaction among the troops with the ROE and with the progress of the war generally. If this new approach were resulting in security, I might have some hope but, as far as I can see, it is not. We are not killing very many Talaban nor disrupting them in a way that leaves them ineffective. There are not very many Afghans that want the Talaban to be in control, but they have little confidence that we will make them secure. They believe that, when we leave, the Taliban will still be there and that they will be vengeful toward those who were too enthusiastic about supporting us. They are trying to accept our aid in a way that the Talaban approve. Getting approval for aid projects from the Tanaban leadership, paying a percentage of the salaries they receive for working on aid projects to the Talaban, etc. We are training a large number of police and soldiers, but the trainers I talked to are not very confident of their readiness or commitment. Our attempt to get the Afghans ready to provide their own security seems neither efficient or effective. Overlaying the whole problem is our reliance on a central government that is corrupt and ineffective. Here and there is a success story (see my piece a few weeks ago about Balkh Province poppy cultivation success which applies to their security success as well), but those success stories seem to me to be little headed. Mostly it appears to me to be a frantic attempt to buy an effective government and security force in a short time. My sense is that we might have them ready to car for themselves in three or four years – by next summer, no hope.
2. How much do contractors get paid? This varies quite a bit. They start with a base salary that seems to be close to what the same job might be paid in the US at the Federal level and they add 35% danger pay for the days in Afghanistan and another 35% post deferential pay (a kind of hardship bonus) which continues unless you are out of country for a certain time during the contract (mine was 30 continuous days). They also add a 10% contract bonus if you finish the years contract and (at least in my case) a bit of money to defray travel expense for the R&R type leave you get (usually about two weeks R&R after about eight weeks work. All these add ons boost the pay about 80% above the base pay. It is a sum that can never be achieved (because you will never have been in country for all 365 days) but it is, for some reason the amount that every one talks about. My pay was typical for mentor or advisor and the amount was roughly ($96,000 base). The Border Patrol training position that I was offered with a different company paid $134,000 (including add ons), The lawyers in the Justice System Support Program are working from a base of around $110,000 which puts the total possible compensation around $200,000. The aviators are compensated a little differently. They get approximately $600 - $700 per day, and the ones I know about work in country for about 60 days with compensation and then have about 30 days off without pay. This puts their annual compensation up around $155,000 with about 4 months off. I think they can choose to work more, but I’m not sure. Meanwhile what I would call project managers are paid around $210,000 total with add ons. I assume that program managers that oversee several projects are 10% or so north of that figure. One of the attractive features of all these contractor positions is the fact that lodging and food are furnished at no cost so there is very little in-country expense to the employee, and most of the compensation can be utilized by the employee. In Afghanistan, the contracts are “alcohol free” and, while it is possible to find a place to drink in Kabul, very little money is spent on that kind of entertainment. There is also an income tax break. In that these salaries are paid for services performed outside the USA and it’s territories, there is up to about $90,000 per year that can be excluded from US income tax if the employee qualifies. To qualify, the employee must 1. Be a resident of a foreign country or 2. Be outside the USA for about 330 days of the 365 in which the employment is contained.
3. What’s going on with the McChrystal flap? I just now went back and reread the Rolling Stone article that precipitated the controversy and McChrystal removal. The “Runaway General” article that reportedly demonstrated ’s McChrystal’s disrespect for his civilian bosses. I am still a little puzzled. Maybe I have become jaded, but I can not find anything in the article that would seem to provoke more that a reprimand. Here are the “disrespectful” items (let me know what I missed): 1. McChrystal voiced dismay at having to dine with a French diplomat; 2. Last fall McChrystal said he thought Biden’s strategy was “short sighted;” 3. McChrystal thought Obama was “uncomfortable and intimidated” by a room full of Military flag officers (this was a year or so ago); 4. An aid characterized McChrystal’s meeting with Obama as a ten minute photo op, said Obama knew little about McCheyatal, and stated that McChrystal was disappointed with the meeting (this also was at least eight months ago); 5. McChrystal found the three month wait for Obama’s decision about a troop increase “painful;” 6. McChrystal characterized the Maja military operation (which he constructed and oversaw) as “a bleeding ulcer;” 7. An aid called Jim Jones a “clown.” This is quite serious, but not at all the same as if McChrystal had said it or if it had been said about the president; 7. McChrystal described Holbrooke as “like a wounded animal” and was reluctant to take phone calls from him; 8.McChrystal’s relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry is strained and, to Eikenberry’s dismay, McChrystal did not appoint the Ambassador as the Afghan Viceroy – McChrystal felt “betrayed” by an Eikenberry memo which was critical of the counter insurgency plan; 9. An aid says that, if the American public really paid attention to the war, there would be even less support; 10. The diplomatic community feels that McChrystal has usurped duties that are properly handled by diplomats. This is an overlay for the strained relationship with Eikenberry and Holbrooke. However, McChrystal has the support of the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. That is a really big “however” when you are talking about conducting foreign diplomacy. In sum, the most pronounced problem is that McChrystal is at odds with the involved diplomats, except the one that really counts, the Secretary of State. He has been successful in being the prime mover in US-Afghan diplomatic events. True, he and his aids have said some “bitchy” things about their civilian bosses, but all these have been pretty typical of subordinate’s private remarks in all organizations. The most disrespectfully, in my opinion, being the “clown” remark about Gen. Jones and the dim-witted remarks about the Vice President. I guess, in sum, it is disrespectful, but it seems to me to fall short of insubordination. I certainly is not akin to moving to invade a neighboring country or refusal to follow orders. However it is characterized, it seems to me to provides little support for the headline Runaway General” and none at all for the sub heading asserting his attitude that “...the real enemy [are] the wimps in the White House.” It looks to me as though everyone has taken these two bogus headings as a valid summation of the entire affair without much real analysis. Joe Klien, in Time magazine, calls McChrystal’s gaff as a “crushing indelicacy” and the Bankok Post editor said McChrystal “criticized and even ridiculed President Barack Obama.” I’ll sign on for indelicacy but see nothing crushing about it nor do I see it as ridiculing the President. Different folks see things differently, I guess.
In my view, the article documents, much more clearly, that the counter insurgence policy (called COIN) is not successful in Afghanistan. COIN endeavors to put soldiers throughout the communities so as to disrupt and make ineffective the insurgents while making the every day life of the population secure – a kind of community policing approach with heavier weapons. It also involves help in building the community infrastructure and governmental apparatus. COIN is the brainchild, primarily, of Gen. Petraeus, and it was a part of his success in Iraq. It has always involved a conscious effort to avoid civilian casualties, but COIN, as practiced under McChrystal, has come to be an avoid armed conflict approach as well as an avoid civilian harm approach. It is not uprooting the Taliban nor making the citizens feel secure. The article also discloses that the troops that are implementing this COIN approach in Afghanistan are very unhappy about it. They do not think it is effective and they think it exposes them to purposeless risk. COIN may (or may not) be a faithful reflection of White House philosophy, but it is being conducted by McChrystal, and it is presently not at all successful.
Anyway, that is my take. A very interesting question to me is why McChrystal would ever cause an openly ruthless left wing reporter, who reports for a left wing publication, to have many weeks of close access. This reporter, Michael Hastings, is on the record as regarding his job to be to f..... news sources in the process of getting stories. He is also known to be left leaning and the Rolling Stone is universally regarded as a leftist publication with no real kinship with the military. McChrystal and his staff are smart, alert, and analytical – this story did not happen by mistake. I can not believe that they were blind sided. There is no doubt in my mind that they facilitated the article for some purpose, and I think they absolutely had to have expected a story from this reporter similar to the one they received. They had to expect that any and all conflicts, mistakes, calamities, and failure would be reported. At the same time, they clearly know that the counterinsurgency is not going well, that the diplomats regard McChrystal as overreaching, that McChrystal is regarded as a staunch supporter of Afghan president Karzai (who’s government is widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective), and that these facts would be reported along with whatever else the reporter discovered. The question then becomes, why would McCrystal want this Rolling Stone article to come about? Almost every leader in every organization devises measures to cover, obscure, or explain the kind of things Hastings wrote about. Why would this leader want them publicly aired? What was McChrystal’s objective? I can see two possibilities: 1. He wanted to expose the situation in an attempt to move the policy in a different direction and/or 2. He wanted to extradite himself from a failing situation. A friend of mine thinks McChryatal is “falling on his sword” so as to change policy. That could be -- and, maybe, he did not expect the reaction to be so extreme. A less kind speculation would be that he wants to remove himself from a mess that he cannot clean up without seeming to “quit.” My guess is that it is mostly number 1, but that number 2 provides a background incentive and makes it more palatable. Are there other possibilities?
4. What are the Afghan people like? What I will describe is based on my limited associations – mostly with the CNAT team members and the Afghan security team.
They are pretty much like people everywhere in that they love their families, want to make life better for their children, want to have good jobs, want security, and wish for peace. They are members of a culture with different underlying presumptions and beliefs than ours. They are most comfortable with local government, respectful of their elders, and deferential to their leaders. They welcome individual input to governmental decisions but are not enthusiastic about our concept of Democracy. Once there is a consensus about community policy, they mostly turn in that direction and support the policy. They think it is silly to give the same weight to the opinion (vote) of a criminal, pervert, or moron as to a respected elder. They associate Western Democracy with promiscuity. They are religious and that religion is Islam, but they think the Taliban have become well outside what the Koran teaches. They mostly support education and business opportunity for all, but they think there are clearly different family and community rolls for men and women. Their marriages are almost all arraigned by their parents and other senior family member, and a very high percentage of those marriages are successful.
5. Why was CNAT and CPI thrown on the trash heap so abruptly? I can only give a reasoned speculation.
Remember that CPI was alerted in mid April to expect a contact extension until next February but, about ten days later, was formally notified that the program would shut down in approximately eight weeks. The CNAT program itself was doing what it was designed to do, though the precise criteria against which it would be evaluated were never established – and it did those things very efficiently. Partly because of this lack of clear performance criteria for the program and the personnel therein, a tension had developed between the Dept. of State INL program manager(s) and the CPI leadership, but the program was limping along although there were a few open conflicts.
Here is what I think happened. There is only one event that I am aware of that occurred within, or around, that ten day period between “extend” and “terminate” that could have changed the INL attitude so drastically. That was the establishment of a narcotics usage and rehabilitation study in Balkh province. The senior International Advisor (IA) in Balk (I was the junior IA there) was the prime mover in the formation of this study. He clearly believed it was worthwhile, but it was also in direct contravention of the specific direction of the INL program manger – a reminder of which had been sent by email just a couple weeks before the formation of the study. I do not believe in coincidence, and my speculation is that the INL program manager used this as a kind of loose cannon argument to contend that CPI and CNAT were beyond control and should be shut down.
This is my own conjecture. I have no certain knowledge. But that is the only event that I know of that could have prompted such a drastic change in position. It is a tragedy! The CNAT program should be studied and emulated rather than ended. The CNAT model allowed the funding to bypass most of the corruption fund diversion opportunities that allow so much aid money to be funneled off. It was able to deliver aid projects, as an example, for about 30% of comparable project costs. If CNAT it had been properly established, with clear performance criteria and some SOP's rather than open ended objectives, it could have achieved US counter narcotic policy objectives very precisely, in my humble opinion.
Monday, June 21, 2010
Traveling
I am traveling in the USA and getting caught up on my Continuing Legal Education (CLE) so that I can be eligible to be considered for a Justice System Support Program (JSSP) job back in Afghanistan. I'm afraid I will not be a strong candidate because I have not actually practiced law (they want courtroom experience), but at least I will be eligible.
I will head back to Dubai on Tues and on to Kabul the day after I arrive. The want to get everyone repatriated as soon as possible, so I will likely leave Kabul the same day I arrive. Possibly (hopefully) they can just send my stuff to Dubai and have me pick it up there -- straight on to Thailand.
I'll get this blog up to date when I get settled.
I will head back to Dubai on Tues and on to Kabul the day after I arrive. The want to get everyone repatriated as soon as possible, so I will likely leave Kabul the same day I arrive. Possibly (hopefully) they can just send my stuff to Dubai and have me pick it up there -- straight on to Thailand.
I'll get this blog up to date when I get settled.
Monday, June 14, 2010
Back to the US (and a guest article about Thailand)
I am back in the USA for a couple weeks. I’ll get my Continuing Legal Education (CLE) caught up so that my law license will be active. That will allow me to be considered for on of the Justice System Support jobs back in Afghanistan (as my present job ends). Unfortunately, I will not be a strong candidate, as I have no real lawyer experience and they have a long roster of candidates who have been prosecutors, defense attorneys, and even judges.
I spent a day in Dubai on the way here. It is a bigger place than I thought. A lot of construction going on, but most of it inactive -- because of the financial melt down, I guess. There are some grand things to see. I saw the worlds tallest building, the worlds biggest mall, a ski slope inside one mall, and a food court in another that is about 110 yards square.
I invite you to read the attached page by James Stent about the Thailand situation. I don't agree with all his opinions (I don't thing there is much to be learned from South Africa in how to reconcile societal problems), but I think it is factually accurate and thoughtful. A very good overview of the situation.
I spent a day in Dubai on the way here. It is a bigger place than I thought. A lot of construction going on, but most of it inactive -- because of the financial melt down, I guess. There are some grand things to see. I saw the worlds tallest building, the worlds biggest mall, a ski slope inside one mall, and a food court in another that is about 110 yards square.
I invite you to read the attached page by James Stent about the Thailand situation. I don't agree with all his opinions (I don't thing there is much to be learned from South Africa in how to reconcile societal problems), but I think it is factually accurate and thoughtful. A very good overview of the situation.
Friday, June 4, 2010
Training the Afghan Police
Well, they did not put my piece about the Balkh poppy free history in the weekkt CNAT report. My senior IA did not make it entirely clear why, except that they are not in total agreement that Governor Attah is the champion that my piece makes him out to be, and that some think Balkh is now growing a lot of Cannibus. Some think the governor is just a Warlord who imposes his will by force. It is probably not too unfair to characterize him as a Worlord but , in my opinion, his success is more due to his being a talented politician and leader than due to any exercise of force. As to the Cannibus, it is harder to detect, but there seems to be sparce evidence as to the extent that it is being grown. Even if it's growth is extensive, it is not dismissive of the fact that the province is poppy free. Anyway, in my opinion, the success of the province (and the Governor)should be studied. Enough about that.
It is getting warm in Northern Afghanistan. The last few days in Mazar have been close to 120 F. Not quite touching the 120 line whenever I looked but just below it. 118 or 119 for sure – hot enough! They tell me there will be days in July that reach 130.
The amount of aid being poured into this country is mind boggling. There is a large military presence here and most of the “surge” troops still to come. It may be, however, that the civilian contractors outnumber the troops – I do not know that the is true, but it would not surprise me. Probably 80% of the contractors work “inside the wire.” That is, they work within a protected compound like the Regional Training Center, where my live-in CONEX is located, or like the Provincial Reconstruction Center (PRT) where the military aid personnel are organized. A few, like me and the other CNAT IA’s work “outside the wire” – doing things out in the towns and countryside and returning to the security of the large protected compound at night (some of the IA’s, though, live outside the wire too). A very few, such a some “imbedded” police trainers (imbedded within a military police training organization) will spend a few days at a time at the work site of their trainees – some even sleeping in tents at those sites. As I mentioned parenthetically above, some of the CNAT IA’s, and a few others live in their own little compounds outside the large military structures – “outside the wire.” They have their own security guards, cooks, maintenance persons, etc.
Anyway, those who both live and work inside the wire are the most comfortable and secure. The level of training (and to some extent, aid) accomplishment, however, almost certainly goes up in proportion to the amount of time spent at the work sites of the Afghans. None of us are achieving a high level of accomplishment, however. It is very complicated and expensive to feed, house, provide work space, and provide security for contractors. The more secure and comfortable it is, the more it costs. As I said, the level of actual achievement almost certainly goes up in some proportion to the time spent at the Afghan work sites, but security becomes more complicated and personal hardship goes up. Dyncorp studied the possibility of having some police trainers, that are presently going to the Afghan sites three or four times a week, spend a few full days now and then out at the police work stations (like the embedded trainers with the military). They (Dyncorp) concluded that they would loose too many experienced trainers to make it worth while. Not a kind cometary on the work ethic of the trainers, but probably a realistic assessment. Don’t get me wrong, most of the police training goes on in an Academy setting which is, of course, at a central secure location like the RTC. But a fair amount also goes on at the Afghan work sites and most (not all) of that is happening for about 3 - 4 hours a day 2 - 4 days per week. As far as I have been able to determine, the few guys who live and work outside the wire are paid the same as those who just go out from time to time.
There are plenty of military guys training and mentorning Afghan police too. They are the best bargain we have, cost wise. Most of them are not MP’s and have no police experience, but they usually have a police advisor, and they seem to do OK. I used to think that having soldiers serving as police was a mistake. I still think it would be in a developed country – being a warrior and being a cop require different attitudes and different organizational cultures (though soldiering in the US military seems to be moving toward a “above all, do no harm to non combatants” policy – and here the German soldiers can hardly kill the insurgents that attack them, let alone seek them out tp exterminate). In places like Afghanistan, however, policing is pretty much a para military venture, and soldiers as police may work fairly well. By the way, I hear the miltary is actually considering a new medal for the exercise of restraint in a combat situation -- no kidding.
I am in Kabul now, on my way to the USA for a couple weeks. I’ll get back here just a few days before the contract ends. I plan to go on to Thailand then. Meanwhile, I’ll see some of you at the Newman family reunion on the 18th.
It is getting warm in Northern Afghanistan. The last few days in Mazar have been close to 120 F. Not quite touching the 120 line whenever I looked but just below it. 118 or 119 for sure – hot enough! They tell me there will be days in July that reach 130.
The amount of aid being poured into this country is mind boggling. There is a large military presence here and most of the “surge” troops still to come. It may be, however, that the civilian contractors outnumber the troops – I do not know that the is true, but it would not surprise me. Probably 80% of the contractors work “inside the wire.” That is, they work within a protected compound like the Regional Training Center, where my live-in CONEX is located, or like the Provincial Reconstruction Center (PRT) where the military aid personnel are organized. A few, like me and the other CNAT IA’s work “outside the wire” – doing things out in the towns and countryside and returning to the security of the large protected compound at night (some of the IA’s, though, live outside the wire too). A very few, such a some “imbedded” police trainers (imbedded within a military police training organization) will spend a few days at a time at the work site of their trainees – some even sleeping in tents at those sites. As I mentioned parenthetically above, some of the CNAT IA’s, and a few others live in their own little compounds outside the large military structures – “outside the wire.” They have their own security guards, cooks, maintenance persons, etc.
Anyway, those who both live and work inside the wire are the most comfortable and secure. The level of training (and to some extent, aid) accomplishment, however, almost certainly goes up in proportion to the amount of time spent at the work sites of the Afghans. None of us are achieving a high level of accomplishment, however. It is very complicated and expensive to feed, house, provide work space, and provide security for contractors. The more secure and comfortable it is, the more it costs. As I said, the level of actual achievement almost certainly goes up in some proportion to the time spent at the Afghan work sites, but security becomes more complicated and personal hardship goes up. Dyncorp studied the possibility of having some police trainers, that are presently going to the Afghan sites three or four times a week, spend a few full days now and then out at the police work stations (like the embedded trainers with the military). They (Dyncorp) concluded that they would loose too many experienced trainers to make it worth while. Not a kind cometary on the work ethic of the trainers, but probably a realistic assessment. Don’t get me wrong, most of the police training goes on in an Academy setting which is, of course, at a central secure location like the RTC. But a fair amount also goes on at the Afghan work sites and most (not all) of that is happening for about 3 - 4 hours a day 2 - 4 days per week. As far as I have been able to determine, the few guys who live and work outside the wire are paid the same as those who just go out from time to time.
There are plenty of military guys training and mentorning Afghan police too. They are the best bargain we have, cost wise. Most of them are not MP’s and have no police experience, but they usually have a police advisor, and they seem to do OK. I used to think that having soldiers serving as police was a mistake. I still think it would be in a developed country – being a warrior and being a cop require different attitudes and different organizational cultures (though soldiering in the US military seems to be moving toward a “above all, do no harm to non combatants” policy – and here the German soldiers can hardly kill the insurgents that attack them, let alone seek them out tp exterminate). In places like Afghanistan, however, policing is pretty much a para military venture, and soldiers as police may work fairly well. By the way, I hear the miltary is actually considering a new medal for the exercise of restraint in a combat situation -- no kidding.
I am in Kabul now, on my way to the USA for a couple weeks. I’ll get back here just a few days before the contract ends. I plan to go on to Thailand then. Meanwhile, I’ll see some of you at the Newman family reunion on the 18th.
Saturday, May 29, 2010
An Afghan Success Story
Every week I or the other IA submit a report about the CNAT team's activities. We lead the report with our observations for the preceeding week. Our Kabul office compiles all seven reports, edits them, and sends them out to a distribution list of interested parties. This week (tomorrow) I intend to submit the piece below. Editorial type observations are not favored -- it may or may not make it into the final report. It is, however, a story that deserves telling.
BALKH IA OBSERVATIONS
This week I we IA’s have been encouraged to write about accomplishments. I am, therefore, going to write about a genuinely amazing counter narcotics accomplishment and how it came to be. It is an accomplishment that I am proud to have been associated with in a small way, though it had been virtually completed by the time I became aware of it. It is something that happened almost overnight and that now goes almost unnoticed. It has been recorded in this space nearly every week for thirty months or so, but it seems to receive little analytical attention from those who examine this report. It is something that everyone in our counter narcotics business wishes to emulate but which very few have studied in detail. You well recognize it when you see it. It is:
The Balkh Province is poppy free.
As I stated, you have read that message countless times in this space. I want to now tell you how it came about and how it continues.
Back in the agricultural year of 2005 - 2006, Balkh Province was number three in Afghanistan in the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of poppies – the production of opium – the contribution to the world heroine supply. One year later fewer fields were planted with poppies and almost all that were so planted were eradicated. A year after that, there were virtually no fields devoted to poppy production. Balk was truly poppy free and almost all the residents of Balkh were happy about that fact – and have remained so until this day. Though it happened quickly, this remarkable achievement was not a fluke. It happened by design. It was planned, organized, executed, reviewed, and managed. The major individual details are simple, though their execution and coordination are not simple at all. Here is an overview:
1. The Governor takes the lead. The Governor, Atta Mohammed Noor, was appointed to his position in 2004. He is a former high school teacher, Mujahadeen fighter, and General officer. About two years after he became Governor, he decided he wanted Balkh to be free of poppies. Without this decision, it would not have happened. There may be ways to accomplish a poppy free province without the active support of the Governor, but most people doubt it. This Governor had already been here for two years. He was here during the time that Balkh Province was number three in poppy production. There is little indication that he ever actively promoted poppy cultivation, but he was certainly aware of it, and he noted both the revenue it brought the province and the problems it produced. No one, as far as I know, is sure precisely what motivated him to change his perspective. There, likely, was no single thing. He weighed the provincial revenue and the difficulties of interrupting this revenue against all the harms that narcotics and the attendant criminal complex produce, and he came down solidly on the side of the law. It is likely that the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP, the predecessor of CNAT), played a roll in the Governor’s shift, as they had actively been bringing him (and others) a counter narcotics (CN) message for a while. Other CN organizations were doing the same. In the midst of these CN programs, various aid organizations were promising aid systems to ameliorate the economic hardships of interrupting the opium revenue and helping move to alternative likelihoods. Whatever the precise components of the Governor’s decision to lead the province to a poppy free state were, all now agree that he, and his cadre of loyal aids, were the single most important component of the accomplishment. His leadership was also the most important factor in establishing the other essential elements discussed below.
2. The political culture changes. The Governor launched a program of education, persuasion, and political inspiration to bring the District Governors, political leaders, religious leaders, education leaders, and influential citizens to his way of thinking. He hosted numerous meeting with all these groups at which he hammered home his counter narcotics message. He spurred the counter narcotics activities of PEP and the other CN organizations and helped them get the message out. He made sure that all these leaders and organizations were well versed in both the practical harms and the religious wrongs of tolerating the production of drugs. The leaders began to become actively involved. Every leader at every meeting was both receiving and transmitting counter narcotics information. Everyone began embracing the CN and rule of law philosophy. This philosophy included the public promise of plant eradication for those fields found to be engaged in poppy cultivation. They promised eradication and they left no doubt that they meant it.
3. The societal culture changes. Hard on the heels of the deliberate education of the leadership came the deliberate education of the citizenry. PEP (now, CNAT), and similar organizations, were communicating their subject matter at every meeting and at every gathering of every type all over the province. One of the most successful elements of the campaign was the support provided to and through the schools. Counter narcotics messages were communicated at school leadership meetings, then at the schools themselves. Finally, the students themselves were taking the message to their homes and were participating in counter narcotics events. Students all over the province were holding counter narcotics rallies and even taking the long eradication sticks in hand and whacking the poppies out in the field. Pictures of students and pictures of the Governor whacking the heads off the poppy plants helped produce a spirit of anti-poppy righteousness. Most of the poppy fields that season were, in fact, eradicated, and much, maybe most, of that eradication was done by students and other volunteers. Even some of the poppy growers, realizing the evil they were perpetrating, grabbed sticks and walloped the life from their own plants. Eradication was done, when possible, early in the season so that the farmer might have a chance of successfully growing a substitute crop, but there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that, where poppies were discovered, they would be eradicated. In just a few months, the provincial attitude about poppy growth shifted 180 degrees. Those who had participated in the poppy industry were now openly ashamed and those who had tolerated it were now in active opposition. The PEP team was helping locate the fields to be eradicated, helping in discovering alternative likelihoods (AL) and putting them in place, and continuing to put out the CN message.
4. Maintaining the accomplishment. As Balkh became poppy free for the first time, PEP became the Counter Narcotics Advisory Team (CNAT). Along with other CN organizations, CNAT then continued to do the things that had helped move the culture to this level. From the time that the 2006 -2007 anti poppy campaign began until May, 2010, PEP/CNAT has conducted over 2,000 CN projects as well as participating in a countless number of CN related activities. The CNAT Monitoring and Verification Officers monitor the countryside and law enforcement information so as to detect any poppy activity. The Alternative Livelihood Officers try to move ahead with providing more and better alternative livelihoods to those who have forgone their old ways. Meanwhile, the CNAT Public Information Officer continues to bring the CN message to as many people as possible in as many ways as prove to be effective. The Gender Affairs officer takes the CN message to the women of Balkh province and helps them participate in alternative likelihoods. By the way, I am told that, as a result of another of the Governor’s initiatives, Balkh is the only province where women are permitted to own retail businesses. Everyone pays close attention to the strategic leadership of the Governor to assure their messages and activities are in accord with his objectives and that they are not duplicative. Balkh remains poppy free and everyone in Balkh is happy about it. So far, so good.
That is a rough synopsis of how this marvelous achievement occurred and how it continues. It truly is a momentous accomplishment. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan and only three are poppy free. The lessons of the Balkh experience are not being successfully employed elsewhere. Of the three, provinces that are poppy free, Balkh was the first and it is the most solidly 100% in that status, as well as the most prideful about it. The only cloud on the horizon in Balkh, that I am aware of, is the one I reported about last week: The growing perception that the aid that was promised for becoming poppy free has not been forthcoming. The Governor frequently mentions his disappointment about that situation, and it is certain that no one’s opinion matters more here than the Governor’s. The other CN cloud in the Afghan sky is the absence of this level of CN progress elsewhere in the country.
5. Recomendations. I’ll conclude with two recommendations: 1. Study what happened here in Balkh province in much more detail than I have provided here – so as to replicate it elsewhere; and 2. Try to ameliorate the Balkh Governor’s unfortunate perception about the aid providers.
Note: An adequate level of security in Balkh Province is considered by most to have been a prerequisite to the achievement described above.
BALKH IA OBSERVATIONS
This week I we IA’s have been encouraged to write about accomplishments. I am, therefore, going to write about a genuinely amazing counter narcotics accomplishment and how it came to be. It is an accomplishment that I am proud to have been associated with in a small way, though it had been virtually completed by the time I became aware of it. It is something that happened almost overnight and that now goes almost unnoticed. It has been recorded in this space nearly every week for thirty months or so, but it seems to receive little analytical attention from those who examine this report. It is something that everyone in our counter narcotics business wishes to emulate but which very few have studied in detail. You well recognize it when you see it. It is:
The Balkh Province is poppy free.
As I stated, you have read that message countless times in this space. I want to now tell you how it came about and how it continues.
Back in the agricultural year of 2005 - 2006, Balkh Province was number three in Afghanistan in the amount of land devoted to the cultivation of poppies – the production of opium – the contribution to the world heroine supply. One year later fewer fields were planted with poppies and almost all that were so planted were eradicated. A year after that, there were virtually no fields devoted to poppy production. Balk was truly poppy free and almost all the residents of Balkh were happy about that fact – and have remained so until this day. Though it happened quickly, this remarkable achievement was not a fluke. It happened by design. It was planned, organized, executed, reviewed, and managed. The major individual details are simple, though their execution and coordination are not simple at all. Here is an overview:
1. The Governor takes the lead. The Governor, Atta Mohammed Noor, was appointed to his position in 2004. He is a former high school teacher, Mujahadeen fighter, and General officer. About two years after he became Governor, he decided he wanted Balkh to be free of poppies. Without this decision, it would not have happened. There may be ways to accomplish a poppy free province without the active support of the Governor, but most people doubt it. This Governor had already been here for two years. He was here during the time that Balkh Province was number three in poppy production. There is little indication that he ever actively promoted poppy cultivation, but he was certainly aware of it, and he noted both the revenue it brought the province and the problems it produced. No one, as far as I know, is sure precisely what motivated him to change his perspective. There, likely, was no single thing. He weighed the provincial revenue and the difficulties of interrupting this revenue against all the harms that narcotics and the attendant criminal complex produce, and he came down solidly on the side of the law. It is likely that the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP, the predecessor of CNAT), played a roll in the Governor’s shift, as they had actively been bringing him (and others) a counter narcotics (CN) message for a while. Other CN organizations were doing the same. In the midst of these CN programs, various aid organizations were promising aid systems to ameliorate the economic hardships of interrupting the opium revenue and helping move to alternative likelihoods. Whatever the precise components of the Governor’s decision to lead the province to a poppy free state were, all now agree that he, and his cadre of loyal aids, were the single most important component of the accomplishment. His leadership was also the most important factor in establishing the other essential elements discussed below.
2. The political culture changes. The Governor launched a program of education, persuasion, and political inspiration to bring the District Governors, political leaders, religious leaders, education leaders, and influential citizens to his way of thinking. He hosted numerous meeting with all these groups at which he hammered home his counter narcotics message. He spurred the counter narcotics activities of PEP and the other CN organizations and helped them get the message out. He made sure that all these leaders and organizations were well versed in both the practical harms and the religious wrongs of tolerating the production of drugs. The leaders began to become actively involved. Every leader at every meeting was both receiving and transmitting counter narcotics information. Everyone began embracing the CN and rule of law philosophy. This philosophy included the public promise of plant eradication for those fields found to be engaged in poppy cultivation. They promised eradication and they left no doubt that they meant it.
3. The societal culture changes. Hard on the heels of the deliberate education of the leadership came the deliberate education of the citizenry. PEP (now, CNAT), and similar organizations, were communicating their subject matter at every meeting and at every gathering of every type all over the province. One of the most successful elements of the campaign was the support provided to and through the schools. Counter narcotics messages were communicated at school leadership meetings, then at the schools themselves. Finally, the students themselves were taking the message to their homes and were participating in counter narcotics events. Students all over the province were holding counter narcotics rallies and even taking the long eradication sticks in hand and whacking the poppies out in the field. Pictures of students and pictures of the Governor whacking the heads off the poppy plants helped produce a spirit of anti-poppy righteousness. Most of the poppy fields that season were, in fact, eradicated, and much, maybe most, of that eradication was done by students and other volunteers. Even some of the poppy growers, realizing the evil they were perpetrating, grabbed sticks and walloped the life from their own plants. Eradication was done, when possible, early in the season so that the farmer might have a chance of successfully growing a substitute crop, but there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that, where poppies were discovered, they would be eradicated. In just a few months, the provincial attitude about poppy growth shifted 180 degrees. Those who had participated in the poppy industry were now openly ashamed and those who had tolerated it were now in active opposition. The PEP team was helping locate the fields to be eradicated, helping in discovering alternative likelihoods (AL) and putting them in place, and continuing to put out the CN message.
4. Maintaining the accomplishment. As Balkh became poppy free for the first time, PEP became the Counter Narcotics Advisory Team (CNAT). Along with other CN organizations, CNAT then continued to do the things that had helped move the culture to this level. From the time that the 2006 -2007 anti poppy campaign began until May, 2010, PEP/CNAT has conducted over 2,000 CN projects as well as participating in a countless number of CN related activities. The CNAT Monitoring and Verification Officers monitor the countryside and law enforcement information so as to detect any poppy activity. The Alternative Livelihood Officers try to move ahead with providing more and better alternative livelihoods to those who have forgone their old ways. Meanwhile, the CNAT Public Information Officer continues to bring the CN message to as many people as possible in as many ways as prove to be effective. The Gender Affairs officer takes the CN message to the women of Balkh province and helps them participate in alternative likelihoods. By the way, I am told that, as a result of another of the Governor’s initiatives, Balkh is the only province where women are permitted to own retail businesses. Everyone pays close attention to the strategic leadership of the Governor to assure their messages and activities are in accord with his objectives and that they are not duplicative. Balkh remains poppy free and everyone in Balkh is happy about it. So far, so good.
That is a rough synopsis of how this marvelous achievement occurred and how it continues. It truly is a momentous accomplishment. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan and only three are poppy free. The lessons of the Balkh experience are not being successfully employed elsewhere. Of the three, provinces that are poppy free, Balkh was the first and it is the most solidly 100% in that status, as well as the most prideful about it. The only cloud on the horizon in Balkh, that I am aware of, is the one I reported about last week: The growing perception that the aid that was promised for becoming poppy free has not been forthcoming. The Governor frequently mentions his disappointment about that situation, and it is certain that no one’s opinion matters more here than the Governor’s. The other CN cloud in the Afghan sky is the absence of this level of CN progress elsewhere in the country.
5. Recomendations. I’ll conclude with two recommendations: 1. Study what happened here in Balkh province in much more detail than I have provided here – so as to replicate it elsewhere; and 2. Try to ameliorate the Balkh Governor’s unfortunate perception about the aid providers.
Note: An adequate level of security in Balkh Province is considered by most to have been a prerequisite to the achievement described above.
Saturday, May 22, 2010
The Blue Mosque
The Mazar area is one of the most secure metropolitan areas in the country. And the Balkh province, generally, is pretty secure. It seems, though, that the insurgent activity in some of the neighboring provinces has been on the rise the past couple months. Now, there is some activity in a couple of the Balkh districts to. Two weeks ago they shot up a school warned the kids not to go to school. This week they left the following message at another school: “Dear teachers and headmasters, we request you to close schools and do not go to schools. If we find any of you going to school, We will kill you.” Isn’t that a sweet message. It is impossible to comprehend the thinking of these loons.
The weather is fairly pleasant. It is hot – the past few days have been close to 110 F but, if you can stay in the shade it is not bad, and it cools down quickly when the sun goes down.
I have nothing to report about the CNAT situation. Everything remains the same. We are scheduled to be out of here on June 27th, and the Afghans have still recieved no official notice about anything. I hope that the lack of notification for the Afghans means that they (the Ministry of Counter Narcotics) are figuring out how to use them rather than just throwing them away. That’s the only logical thing I can think of.
The weather is fairly pleasant. It is hot – the past few days have been close to 110 F but, if you can stay in the shade it is not bad, and it cools down quickly when the sun goes down.
This week I visited the Blue Mosque (pictures). It is one of the most holy Mosques in the world. Here, many believe, is the tomb of, Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Mohammad. It is a very beautiful building, and people come from far away to worship there. Others think he (Ali) is buried in Iraq, but where ever he is inturred, this mosque is to honor him and it is a beautiful place. The city name, Mazar-i-Shairf means “noble shrine.”
I have nothing to report about the CNAT situation. Everything remains the same. We are scheduled to be out of here on June 27th, and the Afghans have still recieved no official notice about anything. I hope that the lack of notification for the Afghans means that they (the Ministry of Counter Narcotics) are figuring out how to use them rather than just throwing them away. That’s the only logical thing I can think of.Sunday, May 16, 2010
Minor Updates
I don’t have much to say this week. No further word about our close down. No close down plan. No work instructions. The Afghans have not yet received any official word that the program is ending. The wild rumors are starting. One rumor that may have some substance is that some, maybe most, of the CNAT team members will be moved to similar jobs withing the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and continue what they have been doing. This rumor also says that the CNAT team style of counter narcotics work will be expanded to other Provinces (we are now in eight), the provinces will be organized into regions, and the regions will have someone like me – an “International Advisor” to provide advice, liaison with the foreign donors, etc. to the various provincial teams in the region. Assuming that the funding that is now going to this program is just reprogrammed to go to the MCN, that approach would work and would make use of the already trained and experienced humam resources that exist within the teams.
Follow up regarding Pam Anderson’s demise from Dancing With the Stars:
Pam was beaten out last week by Erin Andrews, the ESPN reporter, who I regarded as an inferior dancer. I was wrong. I don’t know if Andrews began taking steroids this week or what. I just know that she gave a steamy tango performance that made my eyes bug out. I think that two of the judges were, like me, so surprised that they just could not believe what they were seeing well enough to bring themselves to award her a score of 10. Only Len, the crusty old Brit, gave her a ten. I though that dance would surely be the performance of the night. Then, however, Nicole Scherzinger, the singer from Hawaii, did a dance that clearly surpassed even what Andrews had done. As Len said, it may well be the best performance ever – in the full ten years of the show. If you did not see the it – even if you do not like the show – I urge you to log onto ABC and watch these two dances. I’m irritated that I can not log on and rewatch them myself – if your outside the USA they will not transmit the shows. Anyway, try to take a look. Anyone who will record the show for me will receive a Big Mac (or similar) whenever I’m able. One thing: Everyone did two dances this week, and I don’t know how to separate these two remarkable ones from the other that each lady did – but the lesser dances were not bad either.
Evan Lysacek, the Olympic gold medal figure skater, has, until now, been regarded as the favorite to win. This week, however, both these women made him look like a stiff and awkward long shot. Chad Ochocinco, the Cincinnati Bengals wide receiver has broken just about every foot ball receiving record that ever existed. Clearly he is a superb athlete. Unless he shows the kind of startling improvement next week that Andrews exhibited this week, however, he has no chance.
It continues to warm here. The past two days have both been about 105 F. It is dry, but that is still pretty warm. The absence of humidity, however, allows it to cool to a comfortable level fairly rapidly.
The French are taking over all, or almost all, of the basic police training at this site. DynCorp now is doing a big share of it. Most of the DynCorp instructors will be moved to other in-country jobs. I am told that this has happened before at another site(s), but they moved the training back to US instructors after a while. There is nothing wrong with the French police instructors, but it is much more difficult to find translators/interpreters/language assistants that speak either of the two predominant Afghan languages and French that finding bilingual a Afghan-English speakers.
Follow up regarding Pam Anderson’s demise from Dancing With the Stars:
Pam was beaten out last week by Erin Andrews, the ESPN reporter, who I regarded as an inferior dancer. I was wrong. I don’t know if Andrews began taking steroids this week or what. I just know that she gave a steamy tango performance that made my eyes bug out. I think that two of the judges were, like me, so surprised that they just could not believe what they were seeing well enough to bring themselves to award her a score of 10. Only Len, the crusty old Brit, gave her a ten. I though that dance would surely be the performance of the night. Then, however, Nicole Scherzinger, the singer from Hawaii, did a dance that clearly surpassed even what Andrews had done. As Len said, it may well be the best performance ever – in the full ten years of the show. If you did not see the it – even if you do not like the show – I urge you to log onto ABC and watch these two dances. I’m irritated that I can not log on and rewatch them myself – if your outside the USA they will not transmit the shows. Anyway, try to take a look. Anyone who will record the show for me will receive a Big Mac (or similar) whenever I’m able. One thing: Everyone did two dances this week, and I don’t know how to separate these two remarkable ones from the other that each lady did – but the lesser dances were not bad either.
Evan Lysacek, the Olympic gold medal figure skater, has, until now, been regarded as the favorite to win. This week, however, both these women made him look like a stiff and awkward long shot. Chad Ochocinco, the Cincinnati Bengals wide receiver has broken just about every foot ball receiving record that ever existed. Clearly he is a superb athlete. Unless he shows the kind of startling improvement next week that Andrews exhibited this week, however, he has no chance.
It continues to warm here. The past two days have both been about 105 F. It is dry, but that is still pretty warm. The absence of humidity, however, allows it to cool to a comfortable level fairly rapidly.
The French are taking over all, or almost all, of the basic police training at this site. DynCorp now is doing a big share of it. Most of the DynCorp instructors will be moved to other in-country jobs. I am told that this has happened before at another site(s), but they moved the training back to US instructors after a while. There is nothing wrong with the French police instructors, but it is much more difficult to find translators/interpreters/language assistants that speak either of the two predominant Afghan languages and French that finding bilingual a Afghan-English speakers.
Saturday, May 8, 2010
Goodby to Pam and My Job.
This week my heart is heavy. My job has been eliminated – the whole program will be closed down as of the end of June. More about that below. The thing that makes me downright despondent, however, is that PAM ANDERSON WAS VOTED OFF DANCING WITH THE STARS! Can you believe it? Sure she has quite a few miles on her chassis, but it is still a stunningly alluring frame. Moreover, she performed well. She is coordinated, flexible, balanced, graceful, and athletic. In short she can dance. Admittedly, this week she gave a flawed performance – not as good as previously. Still, her judge’s scores were good enough that she could have been saved by a decent audience vote from across America. It did not happen. Why? No body has more fans than Pam. I think it was Steve Martin who said it something to the effect that a sure measure of the adoration that she commands could be calculated by a simple statistical survey of the number of American males that hold up her poster once or twice every week. One can only surmise that her fans are simply not watching, and that too is lamentable. The Football Hall of Fame running back, Emmitt Smith, made the show culturally acceptable for manly watching five years ago when he not only participated but won the competition! There were already a few of us who were “closet” watchers (what’s not manly about watching a difficult athletic competition where 50% of the contestants are females and most of those females are firm-bodied, graceful, and wearing skimpy costumes), but Emmitt made it respectable. I guess the word is still not out. So long, Pam. You deserved better from your fans.
With that nod to beauty, culture, and smut, I’ll move to a serious topic.
As I reported a few days ago, the US State Department, in concert with the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), has decided to close down the program that I am employed in. I was surprised. The CNAT program has some problems, but it is structured in a way that insured that most of the funding is likely to make it to the aid projects. There were three, somewhat vague, reasons given: 1. To more fully reflect the current Afghan environment, 2. To better support the Ministry of Counter Narcotics in their goals and desires for help from the USA, and 3. Because the Minister has made it clear that he wants to concentrate on capacity building in Kabul (capacity building is the current term for increasing capabilities). Well, these reasons could mean just about anything. One thing they surely mean is that the funds that would presently go to these Provintial CNAT teams will now go somewhere else, and they will flow through the MCN.
During the years I spent in South East Asia in the Vietnam War era, I became aware of some of the massive problems with dispensing foreign aid, particularly when obliged to dispatch it in association with corrupt local officials. I was elated, therefor, to learn that this program employs a model that bypasses most of the favorite corruption channels. Basically, the administrative funds for offices, supplies, transportation, etc. go through the contractor, CPI, and the salaries are paid by the Embassy directly to the CNAT team members. Project funds are dispersed by the CNAT --- with some accounting controls and some monitoring by the International Advisors. CNAT is accomplishing some projects for about 35% of what other organizations are paying contractors for similar jobs. This, I think, is a design that should be studied, refined, and replicated rather than tossed aside. Worse, some think it is being tossed into the potential cash-skim drawer of a central agency that cannot possibly be controlled. It is no secret some observers feel that the newly sworn present Minister of MCN was involved in the disappearance of massive amounts of aid money at his last position.
One of the saddest part of this situation is the fact that, although the CNAT program may, indeed, contain problems, it also contains personnel assets trained and experienced in most of the undertakings of a counter narcotics strategy. These persons also have community development experience and professional contacts. These are capabilities that take substantial time and effort to develop. So far there is no sign of any plan to try to move them into other CN elements.
The most apparent problems with our present program is its lack of clear direction. But these problems are administrative and could be corrected. I was very intrigued as I answered the qualification questions in the application process. It was apparent that they were looking for persons with experience in successfully implementing central policy at the field level. This is a topic that I have worked on, researched, and written about. I am (truly) a minor expert. In my view, the State Department (and CPI) has failed CNAT by not having an administrative template for the program that contains operations manuals, procedural directives, and all the other Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) that everybody bitches about, but that keep ninety five percent of what an organization does in line with its strategic direction. Everything about CNAT has been vague, so it is inevitable that different persons, and different locations, will behave in different ways – mostly with genuine intent to fulfill perceived policy.
Did you ever think you would hear someone standing up for rules and regulations? They are a pain in the neck, but they are important. It is not easy to write good ones, but it is better to have poor ones than to have none. Without SOP’s, mid and upper level managers typically become uneasy about what they think is happening at the field level and try to gain control by issuing orders and memos controlling minutia. They often require their personal approval for routine things like travel, supplies, working-level contacts, etc.
One of the most frequent negative remarks I hear about the contracting in Afghanistan is this very situation (at least with respect to Department of State contracts) That the contractors are being given a contact to accomplish a overarching objective (like train police officers) without the kind of detailed specifications that would help guarantee performance to a certain standard. The big contracting companies will likely dust off some manuals they already have from a past project and do OK. The smaller ones, or the ones with projects that have not been accomplished elsewhere, have problems.
By the way, during my working career, I had the opportunity to work within two agencies that had very different results in accomplishing headquarters objectives at the field level. The Forest Service (USFS) is (or was) probably the most successful agency that has ever been studied in this regard (see the book The Forest Ranger). The Forest Service Handbook contained detailed direction about almost anything that was done at field level and those who did those tasks regarded the Manual as a Bible – they would not dream of deviation. Meanwhile the US Customs Service (USCS) also had fairly detailed directives. At the field level, however, the USCS personnel regarded a headquarters directive as no more than a suggestion. Deviation was great in magnitude and frequent in occurrence. The reason the USFS was successful is that the workers regarded the direction from headquarters as sensible, authoritative, and necessary, The USCS workers thought their SOP’s were stupid and annoying. An explanation of this difference would take a long time, but the USFS success had a lot to do with most of the mangers coming up through the ranks and genuine input from the field to all policy and directives.
With that nod to beauty, culture, and smut, I’ll move to a serious topic.
As I reported a few days ago, the US State Department, in concert with the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN), has decided to close down the program that I am employed in. I was surprised. The CNAT program has some problems, but it is structured in a way that insured that most of the funding is likely to make it to the aid projects. There were three, somewhat vague, reasons given: 1. To more fully reflect the current Afghan environment, 2. To better support the Ministry of Counter Narcotics in their goals and desires for help from the USA, and 3. Because the Minister has made it clear that he wants to concentrate on capacity building in Kabul (capacity building is the current term for increasing capabilities). Well, these reasons could mean just about anything. One thing they surely mean is that the funds that would presently go to these Provintial CNAT teams will now go somewhere else, and they will flow through the MCN.
During the years I spent in South East Asia in the Vietnam War era, I became aware of some of the massive problems with dispensing foreign aid, particularly when obliged to dispatch it in association with corrupt local officials. I was elated, therefor, to learn that this program employs a model that bypasses most of the favorite corruption channels. Basically, the administrative funds for offices, supplies, transportation, etc. go through the contractor, CPI, and the salaries are paid by the Embassy directly to the CNAT team members. Project funds are dispersed by the CNAT --- with some accounting controls and some monitoring by the International Advisors. CNAT is accomplishing some projects for about 35% of what other organizations are paying contractors for similar jobs. This, I think, is a design that should be studied, refined, and replicated rather than tossed aside. Worse, some think it is being tossed into the potential cash-skim drawer of a central agency that cannot possibly be controlled. It is no secret some observers feel that the newly sworn present Minister of MCN was involved in the disappearance of massive amounts of aid money at his last position.
One of the saddest part of this situation is the fact that, although the CNAT program may, indeed, contain problems, it also contains personnel assets trained and experienced in most of the undertakings of a counter narcotics strategy. These persons also have community development experience and professional contacts. These are capabilities that take substantial time and effort to develop. So far there is no sign of any plan to try to move them into other CN elements.
The most apparent problems with our present program is its lack of clear direction. But these problems are administrative and could be corrected. I was very intrigued as I answered the qualification questions in the application process. It was apparent that they were looking for persons with experience in successfully implementing central policy at the field level. This is a topic that I have worked on, researched, and written about. I am (truly) a minor expert. In my view, the State Department (and CPI) has failed CNAT by not having an administrative template for the program that contains operations manuals, procedural directives, and all the other Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) that everybody bitches about, but that keep ninety five percent of what an organization does in line with its strategic direction. Everything about CNAT has been vague, so it is inevitable that different persons, and different locations, will behave in different ways – mostly with genuine intent to fulfill perceived policy.
Did you ever think you would hear someone standing up for rules and regulations? They are a pain in the neck, but they are important. It is not easy to write good ones, but it is better to have poor ones than to have none. Without SOP’s, mid and upper level managers typically become uneasy about what they think is happening at the field level and try to gain control by issuing orders and memos controlling minutia. They often require their personal approval for routine things like travel, supplies, working-level contacts, etc.
One of the most frequent negative remarks I hear about the contracting in Afghanistan is this very situation (at least with respect to Department of State contracts) That the contractors are being given a contact to accomplish a overarching objective (like train police officers) without the kind of detailed specifications that would help guarantee performance to a certain standard. The big contracting companies will likely dust off some manuals they already have from a past project and do OK. The smaller ones, or the ones with projects that have not been accomplished elsewhere, have problems.
By the way, during my working career, I had the opportunity to work within two agencies that had very different results in accomplishing headquarters objectives at the field level. The Forest Service (USFS) is (or was) probably the most successful agency that has ever been studied in this regard (see the book The Forest Ranger). The Forest Service Handbook contained detailed direction about almost anything that was done at field level and those who did those tasks regarded the Manual as a Bible – they would not dream of deviation. Meanwhile the US Customs Service (USCS) also had fairly detailed directives. At the field level, however, the USCS personnel regarded a headquarters directive as no more than a suggestion. Deviation was great in magnitude and frequent in occurrence. The reason the USFS was successful is that the workers regarded the direction from headquarters as sensible, authoritative, and necessary, The USCS workers thought their SOP’s were stupid and annoying. An explanation of this difference would take a long time, but the USFS success had a lot to do with most of the mangers coming up through the ranks and genuine input from the field to all policy and directives.
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Late Post -- Thailand Red Shirt Crisis -- end of CNAT
The past couple weeks have been hectic. I just could not seem to get around to posting this. Yesterday, I was informed that the State Department has cancelled the contract that I am working under – as of the end of June. Actually, they have decided not to extend the “temporary” work order under which we have been functioning. CPI has never had a proper contract – just performing under a repeatedly extended work order for the past two years or so. The work order has been extended every few months with a promise that a proper contract will be awarded down the line. They, apparently, have decided to simply scrap the CNAT program. Meanwhile, CPI is bidding on some other Afghan contracts. If they are awarded one that contains a position for which I am qualified, I hope to be able to just slide into the new position. This, however, is speculation on my part. I am returning to Kabul tomorrow (Monday) from Thailand, and I will find out then if I have any options. It could be that I will simply have worked for only four months – not nearly enough time to buy the Gulfstream executive jet that I’ve had my heart set on.
Back to the past two weeks:
Please try to read the Time magazine article last week about the problems a US Army company has had in just trying to reopen an Afghan school. It is illustrative of the bureaucratic and other troubles that occur with many, probably most, of the potential aid projects in Afghanistan. It demonstrates that the Afghan citizens have to deal with the reality that America and her allies may not have eliminated the Taliban nor have trained an effective security force before they leave. See: www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1982093,00.html
Acquiring an airline ticket in Afghanistan has proven to be an ordeal. Not the acquisition itself, but having any choice of itinerary or seating. I tried two different travel agencies and discovered that it is pretty much a one choice take it or leave it proposition. If you inquire about alternative itineraries it turns into a situation where what you were offered gets cancelled with no other options having been offered. Ask about a seat assignment and you are informed that you will be allotted a seat at the airport. Push the issue and you may lose your reservation. Once you have a reservation number, you can call the airline and they will assign you a seat, but you will likely have to pay (cash) for the ticket before you get a reservation number. The only good thing about the process is that they can get you a significantly better fare than you can find on the internet.
I was deposited into Bangkok at the height (so far) of the Thailand Red Shirt political crisis. There were nearly 30 people killed at a demonstration that got out of control a couple weeks ago and, the day before I arrived, an RPG was fired into a Sky Train station killing a bystander. A couple days ago the Red Shirts stormed the Chulalongkorn University Hospital searching for someone. Today there is a cabinet meeting at which the government will discuss the imposition of martial law. The Red Shirts are supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1108114.stm
Thaksin is now a self-exiled, felony-convicted fugitive billionaire who is providing financial support to the Red Shirts and whipping them up with big-screen televised speeches at their rallies. He is a talented and chiasmatic politician that the poor and rural people see as the only political leader who has instituted political measures specifically to help them. He instituted some long overdue and needed populist reforms (which some opponent see as a step toward Communism). The fact that he moved political corruption and self benefit to a level that was previously unimaginable, seems to make little difference to his supporters. “Sure he is a crook, but they are all crooks – and he is the only crook that helped make my life better” seems to be the attitude.
Thaksin was ousted by a military coup about three and a half years ago. The military proved to be inept at governing and relinquished control a year or so ago to what has evolved into the present government. This present government is, however, is widely regarded as being manipulated by the military and, though the Prime Minister seems to be regarded as non-corrupt, his administration appears to me to be populated by ineffective and dishonest bureaucrats. The Hmong debacle four months ago provides a good example that I am familiar with:
No one doubts that the vast majority of the 4500 or so Hmong that were repatriated to Laos were “economic” migrants just seeking a better life, but it is a clear fact that, among this large group, there were a substantial number of what has come to be called the “Jungle Hmong” who’s repatriation would subject them to almost certain harsh treatment, likely torture, and possible execution. Instead of just sorting the Jungle Hmong from the rest – a classification task that had already pretty much been done by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Thai military screeners – the Thai government separated the potential leaders from the large group but delivered everyone across the Mekong to the Lao authorities. Meanwhile, the Prime and the Foreign Minister blatantly and repeatedly told the public that:
1. The repatriation was voluntary,
2. All the refugees were of an economic nature, and
3. That there was an intergovernmental agreement that would guarantee good treatment of the refugees by the Lao officials (the specific terms of this “agreement” were A. never disclosed, B. were, apparently, never reduced to writing, and C. have no provisions for monitoring and/or verification. I can find no record of any other non defense related agreement between governments that has these characteristics). It seems evident that the “agreement” was (if it even ever existed) a vague verbal understanding between officials that, if they even had the authority, never bothered to do what is customary to move the understanding beyond a conjectural possibility. None of these items, presented by the government officals were true.
The bottom line is that the present Thai government was blatantly dishonest about this particular issue that I care about, so it is reasonable to suspect that they have behaved in a similarly unscrupulous manner on other issues. That is my personal assessment of the present governmental situation, based on this one specific issue that interests me as well as my general observation of ineptitude. As I write this, the present government is asserting that some leaders of the Red Shirts are anti Monarchist. If there is any one thing that almost all Thais feel strongly about it is their common love for this King. Any believed suggestion of an anti Monarchist sentiment is likely to provoke large numbers of Thai citizens to blind outrage. This was proven in the fall of 1976 when dozens of Thai students were slaughtered by a group of Thai citizens who (erroneously) believed those students to be against the King. Based on the observations related above, you can likely guess that I am skeptical about these present charges.
A little more than a year ago, it was the Yellow Shirt group that demonstrated and shut down the BKK airport. They are the group that, generally, support the present government and are staunchly anti Thaksin. Last week a Multi Colored Shirt group was formed and held a couple large rallies to protest the disruption and economic harm that the other two main groups are causing. Everyone hopes that this lovely country and it’s delightful people can find a way to come together. Presently, however, it appears that the two main factions are becoming more hard-nosed and more militant.
Last week the US Embassy hosted a town hall meeting to give advice about the situation. The advice they had was good even if, mostly, self evident. 1. Stay way from the demonstration areas, 2. Remember that you are not the target of the protests, 3. If you find yourself in a demonstration, be polite and move away from it, and 4. Have 72 hours of provisions and water at home in case you become isolated (good general advice in case of hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. too).
The Ambassador was charming and answered questions for about 40 minutes. One young man who sad he was a professional photographer who visits the Red Shirt area every day said the numbers of the Red Shirts are vastly underestimated. He asserted that the official estimation of 50,000 in the area is low by a factor of three or four. The Ambassador was skeptical. He said they are paying close attention and believe the official estimate is accurate.
After the formal meeting ended, the Ambassador was asked if anyone at the Embassy knows what has become of the heads of the families of the former US allies, the repatriated Jungle Hmong group. He seemed mildly surprised by the question and quickly stated something about not being able to talk about some things, but that the Embassy is monitoring the situation. He said they have learned that one cannot believe what the Laos say (what a startling revelation that must have been!). My prediction is that the Jungle Hmong adult males have already been “disappeared.” If there is ever any Lao statement about them it will be that they escaped back to the jungle. The rest will be disbursed around the country, Thailand will receive the bulk of the upcoming Lao hydroelectric kilowatts and investment benefits, and our US State Department will suck up to the Communist so as to expand the Lao American Embassy staff.
That’s it for now. Back to Kabul tomorrow, via Delhi. I’m anxious to see if I have a future employment possibility beyond the next two months and what the next two months will present as we shut down the program. It will be potentially devastating news for the Afghan CNAT team members and the Security team to learn that their program is ending – along with their jobs.
Back to the past two weeks:
Please try to read the Time magazine article last week about the problems a US Army company has had in just trying to reopen an Afghan school. It is illustrative of the bureaucratic and other troubles that occur with many, probably most, of the potential aid projects in Afghanistan. It demonstrates that the Afghan citizens have to deal with the reality that America and her allies may not have eliminated the Taliban nor have trained an effective security force before they leave. See: www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1982093,00.html
Acquiring an airline ticket in Afghanistan has proven to be an ordeal. Not the acquisition itself, but having any choice of itinerary or seating. I tried two different travel agencies and discovered that it is pretty much a one choice take it or leave it proposition. If you inquire about alternative itineraries it turns into a situation where what you were offered gets cancelled with no other options having been offered. Ask about a seat assignment and you are informed that you will be allotted a seat at the airport. Push the issue and you may lose your reservation. Once you have a reservation number, you can call the airline and they will assign you a seat, but you will likely have to pay (cash) for the ticket before you get a reservation number. The only good thing about the process is that they can get you a significantly better fare than you can find on the internet.
I was deposited into Bangkok at the height (so far) of the Thailand Red Shirt political crisis. There were nearly 30 people killed at a demonstration that got out of control a couple weeks ago and, the day before I arrived, an RPG was fired into a Sky Train station killing a bystander. A couple days ago the Red Shirts stormed the Chulalongkorn University Hospital searching for someone. Today there is a cabinet meeting at which the government will discuss the imposition of martial law. The Red Shirts are supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1108114.stm
Thaksin is now a self-exiled, felony-convicted fugitive billionaire who is providing financial support to the Red Shirts and whipping them up with big-screen televised speeches at their rallies. He is a talented and chiasmatic politician that the poor and rural people see as the only political leader who has instituted political measures specifically to help them. He instituted some long overdue and needed populist reforms (which some opponent see as a step toward Communism). The fact that he moved political corruption and self benefit to a level that was previously unimaginable, seems to make little difference to his supporters. “Sure he is a crook, but they are all crooks – and he is the only crook that helped make my life better” seems to be the attitude.
Thaksin was ousted by a military coup about three and a half years ago. The military proved to be inept at governing and relinquished control a year or so ago to what has evolved into the present government. This present government is, however, is widely regarded as being manipulated by the military and, though the Prime Minister seems to be regarded as non-corrupt, his administration appears to me to be populated by ineffective and dishonest bureaucrats. The Hmong debacle four months ago provides a good example that I am familiar with:
No one doubts that the vast majority of the 4500 or so Hmong that were repatriated to Laos were “economic” migrants just seeking a better life, but it is a clear fact that, among this large group, there were a substantial number of what has come to be called the “Jungle Hmong” who’s repatriation would subject them to almost certain harsh treatment, likely torture, and possible execution. Instead of just sorting the Jungle Hmong from the rest – a classification task that had already pretty much been done by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Thai military screeners – the Thai government separated the potential leaders from the large group but delivered everyone across the Mekong to the Lao authorities. Meanwhile, the Prime and the Foreign Minister blatantly and repeatedly told the public that:
1. The repatriation was voluntary,
2. All the refugees were of an economic nature, and
3. That there was an intergovernmental agreement that would guarantee good treatment of the refugees by the Lao officials (the specific terms of this “agreement” were A. never disclosed, B. were, apparently, never reduced to writing, and C. have no provisions for monitoring and/or verification. I can find no record of any other non defense related agreement between governments that has these characteristics). It seems evident that the “agreement” was (if it even ever existed) a vague verbal understanding between officials that, if they even had the authority, never bothered to do what is customary to move the understanding beyond a conjectural possibility. None of these items, presented by the government officals were true.
The bottom line is that the present Thai government was blatantly dishonest about this particular issue that I care about, so it is reasonable to suspect that they have behaved in a similarly unscrupulous manner on other issues. That is my personal assessment of the present governmental situation, based on this one specific issue that interests me as well as my general observation of ineptitude. As I write this, the present government is asserting that some leaders of the Red Shirts are anti Monarchist. If there is any one thing that almost all Thais feel strongly about it is their common love for this King. Any believed suggestion of an anti Monarchist sentiment is likely to provoke large numbers of Thai citizens to blind outrage. This was proven in the fall of 1976 when dozens of Thai students were slaughtered by a group of Thai citizens who (erroneously) believed those students to be against the King. Based on the observations related above, you can likely guess that I am skeptical about these present charges.
A little more than a year ago, it was the Yellow Shirt group that demonstrated and shut down the BKK airport. They are the group that, generally, support the present government and are staunchly anti Thaksin. Last week a Multi Colored Shirt group was formed and held a couple large rallies to protest the disruption and economic harm that the other two main groups are causing. Everyone hopes that this lovely country and it’s delightful people can find a way to come together. Presently, however, it appears that the two main factions are becoming more hard-nosed and more militant.
Last week the US Embassy hosted a town hall meeting to give advice about the situation. The advice they had was good even if, mostly, self evident. 1. Stay way from the demonstration areas, 2. Remember that you are not the target of the protests, 3. If you find yourself in a demonstration, be polite and move away from it, and 4. Have 72 hours of provisions and water at home in case you become isolated (good general advice in case of hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. too).
The Ambassador was charming and answered questions for about 40 minutes. One young man who sad he was a professional photographer who visits the Red Shirt area every day said the numbers of the Red Shirts are vastly underestimated. He asserted that the official estimation of 50,000 in the area is low by a factor of three or four. The Ambassador was skeptical. He said they are paying close attention and believe the official estimate is accurate.
After the formal meeting ended, the Ambassador was asked if anyone at the Embassy knows what has become of the heads of the families of the former US allies, the repatriated Jungle Hmong group. He seemed mildly surprised by the question and quickly stated something about not being able to talk about some things, but that the Embassy is monitoring the situation. He said they have learned that one cannot believe what the Laos say (what a startling revelation that must have been!). My prediction is that the Jungle Hmong adult males have already been “disappeared.” If there is ever any Lao statement about them it will be that they escaped back to the jungle. The rest will be disbursed around the country, Thailand will receive the bulk of the upcoming Lao hydroelectric kilowatts and investment benefits, and our US State Department will suck up to the Communist so as to expand the Lao American Embassy staff.
That’s it for now. Back to Kabul tomorrow, via Delhi. I’m anxious to see if I have a future employment possibility beyond the next two months and what the next two months will present as we shut down the program. It will be potentially devastating news for the Afghan CNAT team members and the Security team to learn that their program is ending – along with their jobs.
Friday, April 16, 2010
A Training Day and Mike Spann's death site
Since the team leader was in Kabul, here was no staff meeting Saturday. By Monday he had returned and I instructed an Introduction to Project Management Class that day. The entire CNAT team attended. The morning went very well, and the team members seemed to be enthusiastic, particapative, and receptive. After lunch, it still proceeded fairly well, but there was evidence of sleepiness and somewhat less attention. Aggravating this was the fact that the class really needed another four or five hours. The afternoon, therefore, consisted of more lecture and less participation, in an attempt to introduce all the material. Maybe we can follow up at a later date. The picture to the right is the CNAT team on our training day.The weather has been nice. One hot day – up to 105 F, but mostly comfortable and clear. There is never-ending dust in the air. It looks like mild smog, but it is dust. A thin layer on everything.
We still cannot do field trips because of not having a reliable second vehichle. DynCorp loaned us a tire to replace the one that blew out a couple weeks ago, but the F-250 is so junky that the Security chief does not want to take it out of town.
I visited the Quala-i-Jangi fortress where Mike Spann was killed. Mike was a CIA employee who was the first American killed in what became the Afghan war. The Mike Spann Army base is located near the site of his death. The events associated with his death occured in late November of 2001. The Taliban had been pretty well defeated in this area by the Northern Alliance. You will remember that Ahmad Shah Massoud, the legendary leader of the Northern Alliance, had been assassinate by Al Qaeda operatives posing as journalists just two days before the 9/11 attack. His successor, Gen. Dostum, in late November, negotiated a deal with the defeated Taliban. The agreement was that, if the Taliban would surrender their weapons, the Afghan Taliban would be allowed to go to their homes. There were, however, several hundred foreign national Taliban. Apparently Gen. Dostum’s staff and the Afghan Taliban leaders agreed to make it seem that the agreement applied to Taliban generally, though it was never intended that the foreign nationals would be allowed to leave, at least not until after they has been interviewed about Al Qaeda. During the disarmament, some of the foreign nationals, probably smelling a rat, secreted grenades and, possibly, some hand guns in their clothing. This group of several hundred foreign Taliban were transported to the fortress.
The fortress was build back in the late 1800's. It is massive. It probably measures 300 - 400 yards on each side. It consists of a wall around 30 feet high and 30 feet thick and is divided, more or less in half, by a another wall running East and West. The Northern half contains General Dostum’s headquarters and his residence. The Southern half, containing a few buildings which included an armory, became a makeshift prison for the foreign Taliban. The Taliban disarmament occurred on Nov. 24th and some of the Taliban were moved to the fortress that day. The rest followed on the 25th. Some of the prisoners were put in a building near the center of this compound, but most of them were seated in the open field area. Some, but not all had their hands bound. There were only a few guards, and the oversight of the prisoners was not well organized. On the 25th Spann and another CIA agent began interviewing the prisoners, one of which was the infamous “American Taliban,” John Walker Lindh. The interviewing had gone on for a while when one of the prisoners blew himself and a guard up with a grenade. This triggered a general uprising which included Spann being attacked by the prisoners near him. There were some journalists and medical personnel in the compound along with the few guards, Spann, and the other CIA operative. Spann stood his ground and fought with an AK-47, then a pistol, then his fists while the others fought a retreat action through the gate into the North half of the fortress. Most who have studied the action believe that the others would likely not have made it except for Spann’s standing his ground. He was eventually overwhelmed and beaten to death. All the other friendly foreigners made it out.
Once the others were out, the few Taliban who made it through the gate killed or captured, and the gate secured, the Taliban were effectively contained within the walls of the southern half of the fortress. There were somewhere between 300 and 500 of them – probably closer to 300. What followed was an embarrassing series of events which continued for six days. These events began with an attempt to drop a “smart bomb” on the armory so as to deny it’s armaments to the prisoners. With the assistance of about four laser target designators from four different locations around the fortress, the 500 pound smart bomb missed the armory building by at least 100 yards. Apparently there were two or three more smart bombs deployed which missed by equally embarrassing margins. Meanwhile the friendlies are bringing more troops and more equipment to the walls of the fortress. Somewhere along the line they even get a tank up on one of the ramparts and it begins firing into the compound. Having the Taliban in a “fish in a barrel” situation, the good guys offered the bad guys a chance to give up. They refused. Soon the bad guys discover the armory and become well-armed fish in a barrel. For the next few days the strategy alternated between trying to kill them and trying to get them to surrender. Little by little the Taliban are driven from the compound into the largest of the buildings which contains a basement (where some of them had been held prisoner back on day one). Now the tank was blasting at the building, bombs continued to be dropped with little effect, and dozens (maybe hundreds of soldiers were blazing away at the building and the few Taliban that show themselves. Thinking, I guess, that a 2000 pound bomb would be smarter than the 500 pounders, the Air Force drops one of those huge bunker-buster monsters on the building into which most of the Taliban had now retreated. It produce an explosion like noone had ever seen or heard. It proved, however, to be even dumber than the five hundred pound variety. Not only did it miss the targeted building, but it hit the friendly tank – destroying it and killing several soldiers.
By the third day, all the surviving Taliban were in the basement of the building, but they still refused to surrender. We tried shooting into the building, dropping grenades through the basement windows, and bombing it. Most of the bombs missed and the few that did hit the building did not penetrate into the basement. We pored a large quantity of diesel fuel and gasoline though the windows and threw in a match. Apparently too much diesel and not enough gas – it burned but did not explode. No one comes out. On the fourth day, the General had the water from an irrigation canal diverted into the basement. No one came out. After several hours, thinking all are drowned, the solders cautiously started to enter. They were met with a grenade and gunfire. They kept the water flowing and, on the sixth day, the third day of flooding, the Taliban gave up. Eighty seven men finally emerged. One of them was John Walker Lindh who was later sentenced to 20 years in prison.
The Southern compound has not been repaired. All the buildings are a mass of bullet marks and explosive damage. It is a little grown over with brush and weeds. There is, however, a nice memorial to Mike Spann on or very near the place where he died.
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Above is my security crew ready to take me to the office. I live in the CONEX over my left sholder.
Friday, April 9, 2010
Still in Mazar -- My Fitness Test
A late report: While in Kabul, I had to take the CPI Physical Agility Test. This will give you an idea of why we IA’s may be the first group called on to back up the Recon Marines, Delta Force, or the Seals. Here is the test:
1. Walk a quarter mile in 10 minutes or less,
2. Walk up and down a 10-step minimum staircase,
3. Lift/press 20 pounds over head, and
4. (this is the one that really separates the athletes from the couch potatoes) Walk 50 feet carrying 20 pounds of additional weight.
Fortunately, I have been carrying at least 40 pounds of additional weight for many years, so I was able to make it through number four with only mild exhaustion. I just hope they don’t up the distance to 60 feet. Anyway, I passed. It may have helped that I was able to take a nap between number one and number two.
This week I readied the training materials for the Introduction to Project Management training. Late in the week we decided to do the training in one day – a “training day” – next Monday.
I was unable to take any field trips because we have no spare tire for the junky F-250. They had sent one from Kabul which proved to have a big unreparable hole in it. I have eight armed men to protect me and small housing complex to house them. There are two “hard” vehicles required for all movements. But, with all this in-place expense, it is necessary to use an abandoned F-250 as the second car (the original was wrecked a couple years ago) and we cannot find enough money to buy a tire for it. In this same vein, some of the site security chiefs are buying ammunition with their own money with which to train the guards.
There are a number of Counter Narcotics Assistance Team (CNAT) related things going on in Balkh Province. Since Balkh Province is virtually poppy free, most of the projects have to do with Public Information, Gender Affairs, and Alternative Livelihoods. Monitoring and Verification are ongoing, of course, but they are more routine. I will mention a few recent programs that seem to be forward looking and promising.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently distributed 30,000 baby chicks to about 1,000 vulnerable women in the two of the districts of Balkh Province. The term “vulnerable” is not well defined, but the intent is that the women be in need of assistance and livelihood support. The Balkh CNAT proposes to augment this, and future, chicken projects with Colombo Plan add-on training for the care, feeding, and medicating of the chickens. The FAO has voice support for this effort.
.The Balkh Agriculture Directorate has recently distributed 2,500,000 saplings (both fruit and non-fruit) to the farmers of all Balkh districts. These saplings will provide alternative livelihood possibilities and will also help reduce soil erosion, regenerate oxygen, improve water retention, and promote a “greening” of the Balkh Province for a better environment. CNAT has been active at these distributions with counter narcotic messages and messages of support for the concept.
.The FAO, in cooperation with the Balkh Forestry Department, is in the process of establishing two pistachio plantations. These plantations will provide research data about the successful development of a pistachio industry in the area. There are obvious alternative livelihood possibilities here, and the plantations may also provide some rehabilitative employment for drug addicts. The head of the Forestry Department has voiced support for CNAT projects and involvement.
.There are a number of other project progressing in which CNAT has various degrees of participation.
.The FAO is distributing several species of animal semen to the local Vetenarians and educating the Balkh farmers about its use to upgrade the quality of the local livestock. The CNAT attends the seminars to give support and get it’s message out.
.There is an ongoing rug weaving training program that provides alternative livelihood as well as rehabilitive employment.
.The CNAT team participates in events such as the recent canal cleaning project in Dedade district and the Afghan New Year festivities to promote the counter narcotic messages.
.There has been $20,000 allocated to Balkh Province CNAT for PI purposes. The CNAT team is studying how to best use it taking into account the Governor’s objectives and how to maximize effectiveness.
I have submitted a recommendation that CPI revisit the policy about arming the AIs. Some of us already have more firearms training and experience than the sum of our Afghan security guards, and it is not particularly difficult to qualify a novice – if someone cannot qualify or does not want to, nothing is lost. With almost every expat here at the Regional Training Center (RTC) being armed (both inside and outside the wire), one wonders why the divergence of US policy.
There is one other small expatriate group here at the RTC that is also not armed. They are the Justice System Support Team – lawyers helping establish a modern criminal justice system – also a State Department project. I have been told that, in a firefight, they are not even allowed to pick up a downed guard’s weapon and use it to defend themselves. Someone actually said that with a straight face. There are clearly some DofS policy makers that are well qualified to work in the financial industry (see the mortgage fiasco last week).
That’s it for this week. It seems like about 90% of my past two weeks writing has been bitching. Oh, well. Maybe I need some R&R – I’m due in another 10 days or so.
1. Walk a quarter mile in 10 minutes or less,
2. Walk up and down a 10-step minimum staircase,
3. Lift/press 20 pounds over head, and
4. (this is the one that really separates the athletes from the couch potatoes) Walk 50 feet carrying 20 pounds of additional weight.
Fortunately, I have been carrying at least 40 pounds of additional weight for many years, so I was able to make it through number four with only mild exhaustion. I just hope they don’t up the distance to 60 feet. Anyway, I passed. It may have helped that I was able to take a nap between number one and number two.
This week I readied the training materials for the Introduction to Project Management training. Late in the week we decided to do the training in one day – a “training day” – next Monday.
I was unable to take any field trips because we have no spare tire for the junky F-250. They had sent one from Kabul which proved to have a big unreparable hole in it. I have eight armed men to protect me and small housing complex to house them. There are two “hard” vehicles required for all movements. But, with all this in-place expense, it is necessary to use an abandoned F-250 as the second car (the original was wrecked a couple years ago) and we cannot find enough money to buy a tire for it. In this same vein, some of the site security chiefs are buying ammunition with their own money with which to train the guards.
There are a number of Counter Narcotics Assistance Team (CNAT) related things going on in Balkh Province. Since Balkh Province is virtually poppy free, most of the projects have to do with Public Information, Gender Affairs, and Alternative Livelihoods. Monitoring and Verification are ongoing, of course, but they are more routine. I will mention a few recent programs that seem to be forward looking and promising.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recently distributed 30,000 baby chicks to about 1,000 vulnerable women in the two of the districts of Balkh Province. The term “vulnerable” is not well defined, but the intent is that the women be in need of assistance and livelihood support. The Balkh CNAT proposes to augment this, and future, chicken projects with Colombo Plan add-on training for the care, feeding, and medicating of the chickens. The FAO has voice support for this effort.
.The Balkh Agriculture Directorate has recently distributed 2,500,000 saplings (both fruit and non-fruit) to the farmers of all Balkh districts. These saplings will provide alternative livelihood possibilities and will also help reduce soil erosion, regenerate oxygen, improve water retention, and promote a “greening” of the Balkh Province for a better environment. CNAT has been active at these distributions with counter narcotic messages and messages of support for the concept.
.The FAO, in cooperation with the Balkh Forestry Department, is in the process of establishing two pistachio plantations. These plantations will provide research data about the successful development of a pistachio industry in the area. There are obvious alternative livelihood possibilities here, and the plantations may also provide some rehabilitative employment for drug addicts. The head of the Forestry Department has voiced support for CNAT projects and involvement.
.There are a number of other project progressing in which CNAT has various degrees of participation.
.The FAO is distributing several species of animal semen to the local Vetenarians and educating the Balkh farmers about its use to upgrade the quality of the local livestock. The CNAT attends the seminars to give support and get it’s message out.
.There is an ongoing rug weaving training program that provides alternative livelihood as well as rehabilitive employment.
.The CNAT team participates in events such as the recent canal cleaning project in Dedade district and the Afghan New Year festivities to promote the counter narcotic messages.
.There has been $20,000 allocated to Balkh Province CNAT for PI purposes. The CNAT team is studying how to best use it taking into account the Governor’s objectives and how to maximize effectiveness.
I have submitted a recommendation that CPI revisit the policy about arming the AIs. Some of us already have more firearms training and experience than the sum of our Afghan security guards, and it is not particularly difficult to qualify a novice – if someone cannot qualify or does not want to, nothing is lost. With almost every expat here at the Regional Training Center (RTC) being armed (both inside and outside the wire), one wonders why the divergence of US policy.
There is one other small expatriate group here at the RTC that is also not armed. They are the Justice System Support Team – lawyers helping establish a modern criminal justice system – also a State Department project. I have been told that, in a firefight, they are not even allowed to pick up a downed guard’s weapon and use it to defend themselves. Someone actually said that with a straight face. There are clearly some DofS policy makers that are well qualified to work in the financial industry (see the mortgage fiasco last week).
That’s it for this week. It seems like about 90% of my past two weeks writing has been bitching. Oh, well. Maybe I need some R&R – I’m due in another 10 days or so.
Friday, April 2, 2010
Slow week in Mazur and the Mortgage mess
I have learned that the Buzkachi season is over – no more games at the stadium down the road. The match that I viewed from our guard tower may have been the last one of the year.
Saturday I attended the CNAT staff meeting. They do not use the progress slides for the past week and the next week’s preview slides that the Jalalabad team uses. Also, they did not pause for translation. It was therefor, not easy for me to follow what was happening. Each team member talked about their projects, and the interpreter translated what they were saying at my ear. It was very difficult to understand. The fact that my hearing aid amplifies the person speaking as much (or more) that the mutterings of the translator does not help.
The CNAT offices are in town. I estimate they are three or four miles from the RTC where I stay. The team leader and the translator both recommend that I not come in every day. I plan, therefor, to go there about three times a week. Sat. for the staff meeting for sure and two or three other days.
The building contractors here do not put "goose neck" water traps in the sink, floor, and shower drains. The sewer gasses waft up into the bathroom. Not a good idea. The only worse idea is turning on the electric vent fan and closing the door so as to get rid of the smell.
I have learned that several of the team members are not computer literate. Also, the team’s annual plan just consists of a rewording of their statement of work, No details as to how they plan to fulfill the broad objectives, etc. Wednesday, I proposed to the team leader that I teach a project management class. He thought it was a good idea. I can introduce some fundamental planning concepts and tools in the course of a very basic project management course. I expect that I can give them enough to be useful in about three or four two hour sessions. It is difficult to estimate because of the language thing. I will prepare some materials and take them to the translator at the Saturday staff meeting.
This has been a slow week. I have been occupied, though, with completing a refinance loan on my FL condo. It has been a night mare. I do not know how they stay in business. Six months to complete. One silly repetitive mistaken thing after another. It deserves to be talked about. I’ll chronicle the miserable experience this weekend and add it to this posting.
The Mortgage Mess has been moved to it's own page at the upper left of the blog
Saturday I attended the CNAT staff meeting. They do not use the progress slides for the past week and the next week’s preview slides that the Jalalabad team uses. Also, they did not pause for translation. It was therefor, not easy for me to follow what was happening. Each team member talked about their projects, and the interpreter translated what they were saying at my ear. It was very difficult to understand. The fact that my hearing aid amplifies the person speaking as much (or more) that the mutterings of the translator does not help.
The CNAT offices are in town. I estimate they are three or four miles from the RTC where I stay. The team leader and the translator both recommend that I not come in every day. I plan, therefor, to go there about three times a week. Sat. for the staff meeting for sure and two or three other days.
The building contractors here do not put "goose neck" water traps in the sink, floor, and shower drains. The sewer gasses waft up into the bathroom. Not a good idea. The only worse idea is turning on the electric vent fan and closing the door so as to get rid of the smell.
I have learned that several of the team members are not computer literate. Also, the team’s annual plan just consists of a rewording of their statement of work, No details as to how they plan to fulfill the broad objectives, etc. Wednesday, I proposed to the team leader that I teach a project management class. He thought it was a good idea. I can introduce some fundamental planning concepts and tools in the course of a very basic project management course. I expect that I can give them enough to be useful in about three or four two hour sessions. It is difficult to estimate because of the language thing. I will prepare some materials and take them to the translator at the Saturday staff meeting.
This has been a slow week. I have been occupied, though, with completing a refinance loan on my FL condo. It has been a night mare. I do not know how they stay in business. Six months to complete. One silly repetitive mistaken thing after another. It deserves to be talked about. I’ll chronicle the miserable experience this weekend and add it to this posting.
The Mortgage Mess has been moved to it's own page at the upper left of the blog
Friday, March 26, 2010
Mazar-I-Sharif and the sport of Buzkashi
I am now in Mazar-E-Sharif, in the province of Balx (or Balkh), one of the Northernmost provinces. It borders Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan is a little West and Tajikistan is a little East). A lot of history here. Alexander the Great spent some time here (around 300 BC), as did Genghis Khan in 1209. Alexander once said "I am not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep; I am afraid of an army of sheep led by a lion." Fifteen centuries later, Genghis Khan reportedly said “man’s greatest pleasure is to see his enemies flee before him with their cities in flames, to seize their treasure, and to gather to his bosom their wives and daughters.” I think that was even before sensitivity training became mandatary.
Saturday I boarded a Russian airplane to come here from Kabul. The Rusian airplane was not the strange looking passenger jet that I had seen at the Kabul airport, however. It was a 20 - 30 passenger Russian twin engine turbo prop airplane, the AN-26 – a solid practical aircraft that boards from a ramp in the back. I was met at Mazar by the resident AI, an Australian who has been an AI for over two years and who has been in several other foreign countries on UN missions for many years.
The Security Chief here is a former soldier in the Macedonian Army. CPI has three or four Macedonians as Security Chiefs at various locations here, along with a Croatian, a couple Brits and two Aussies. The guards (including drivers) are all Afghan and vary in number from about seven at places like Mazar, where the living quarters are aboard a military or police installations, to about 17 at places like Jalalabad where we have our own compound. At the military or police compounds, the perimeter guards are provided by the installation host. Here at Mazar we are contained in a police training center called a Regional Training Center (RTC). The trainers are contractors, police, and military from several countries including the US, France, Germany, and Sweden. The facility guards here are Gurkhas.
There is a Regional Reconstruction Team (PRT) (military) down the road, and a military airbase across the runway from the civilian terminal. The air base is run, primarily, by the Germans, though several countries, including the US, are represented there. We also passed a prison training facility on the way here from the airport. There is a lot of military and police facility training construction going on in this area. Huge areas adjacent to the military part of the airport are under construction, and other smaller ones out that direction in addition to the big prison project already mentioned.
This facility where I live is a square about 250 yards on each side. There is a wall of fence about 12 feet high with about 30 yards outside it until another shorter barbed wire fence. I do not know if that space is mined or not. On the other two sides is a space about the size of the compound in which expansion construction is taking place. There is so much military and police construction going on here that it seems likely that someone thinks we (the US) will be her for a while – at least in a training capacity.
The weather was cold at Kabul, and it was even colder at Mazar where it was also windy and hazy from dust. The cold remained through Wednesday (actually began warming Wed. PM), as I became familiar with the Mazar situation. It appears that the city is on a large plane that stretches North from the mountains toward the river that forms the countries boundry. It looks very green and fertile. The flat fields appear to be irrigated. Still, there is dust everywhere – a light film of fine dust is on everything.
The parts of the city that I have seen so far looks a little more prosperous than Jalalabad. There is more concrete (the gas station pump areas, for example) and there is a fair amount of housing construction going on which includes quite a few very large “villa” type homes. A building on the way to the Airport is about 10 stories high and is the tallest structure I have seen except for a row of grain elevators across the road from my compound. The streets are busy and the businesses appear to have customers. Ninety percent of the persons on the streets are men, and ninety percent of the women that are seen are wearing burkas.
I am receiving an email daily intelligence report now that I did not get before. It discloses that there is some insurgent activity in virtually every province but, by far, the most activity is in Kandahar and Hilmand. The Afghan New Year (also known as the Solar New Year and the Persian New year) began last Sunday, and many people from outside the province came here to visit the “Blue Mosque” in the city. Mazur is generally one of the most secure provinces, though there are thought to be bad quys in the mountains to the West who come to this area and do hostile things from time to time. The security forces are extra vigilant for the New Year. By security procedure, most of my vehicular movements require two vehicles. Our second one here is an old F-250 which blew a tire Thurs. We will have to now get it fixed. Since the Mazar city area is relatively secure, though, I’ll still be able to take care of most business with only the “hard car” Land Cruiser.
I met the CNAT team on Tuesday with the resident IA who then departed for R&R. He will be back in mid April – I’m on my own until then. On Thursday, Farmer’s day, the CNAT team went to a celebration that included some instruction to the local farmers about artificial insemination. The Dept. Of Agriculture is trying to use it as means of upgrading the local animal quality. They plan to furnish high quality semen to the local Vets and encourage the farmers to avail their animals. CNAT will take posters and hand outs to get their message out, but they wish they had been given enough notice to try to get funding for a TV set or a Washer which have proven to be a big hit for a “lucky farmer” drawing at these events.
About a quarter of a mile down the road from my compound is a Buzkashi stadium – a big dirt field with bleacher seats along one side. This is where they play the equestrian sport of Buskashi. It is rough. Some say that a good Buzkashi match makes Ultimate Fighting seem like a playground event. The game is composed of a bunch of guys on horses (a big big bunch – maybe a hundred) trying to grab the gutted carcass of a goat or calf (calves are preferred because they resist being torn to pieces better) and carrying it on some predetermined course( that I don’t quite understand) so as to deposit it at a kind of goal. The game goes on and on and on – in some places for days. There are dozens of randomly moving riders just seemingly having no purpose around the edges while the intense action is occurring out in the middle in a cloud of dust and a wild flurry of ongoing equestrian activity. Sometimes the calf carcass will fly up into the air – I don’t know if one guy is throwing it to another or if it is just a part of freeing it up. Once in a while the center of activity will move close enough to see the riders whipping and shoving and punching and grabbing at the carcass while their horses (a good one is extremely valuable) lunge and shove among each other to move to the carcass or to move powerfully away if their rider has a good grip. At one point an excited and partisan fan lunged into the fray and began lashing at one of the horses. He was promptly knocked on his ass and trampled – no one batted an eye – he escaped with only a slight limp. No prissy riding suites, shinny boots, or well brushed helmets here – though I’m told that the riders dress in sturdy cloths and heavy turbines to help absorb some of the punishment. It looks like a free for all bar fight on horseback, but they say that it actually involves a great deal of skill that takes years to learn (come to think of it, that might be true of free for all bar fighting too). Most of the super stars of the sport are guys in their late thirties or in their forties. It is probably a little late for me to become world-class at either Buzkashi or bar fighting. Oh, well, nothing can take away my dream of becoming a ballet dancer or a hip hop star. (the picture is from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/29/afghanistans_ultimate_sport) If you click on the picture, it should enlarge. You can see the carcass hanging down between the second and third horse from the left. I think the guy on the third horse presently has it, and the rider on the second is trying to take it away. The fifth rider is holding the one with the carcass from escaping to the left and the forthe guy is coming in to help one side or the other.
Saturday I boarded a Russian airplane to come here from Kabul. The Rusian airplane was not the strange looking passenger jet that I had seen at the Kabul airport, however. It was a 20 - 30 passenger Russian twin engine turbo prop airplane, the AN-26 – a solid practical aircraft that boards from a ramp in the back. I was met at Mazar by the resident AI, an Australian who has been an AI for over two years and who has been in several other foreign countries on UN missions for many years.
The Security Chief here is a former soldier in the Macedonian Army. CPI has three or four Macedonians as Security Chiefs at various locations here, along with a Croatian, a couple Brits and two Aussies. The guards (including drivers) are all Afghan and vary in number from about seven at places like Mazar, where the living quarters are aboard a military or police installations, to about 17 at places like Jalalabad where we have our own compound. At the military or police compounds, the perimeter guards are provided by the installation host. Here at Mazar we are contained in a police training center called a Regional Training Center (RTC). The trainers are contractors, police, and military from several countries including the US, France, Germany, and Sweden. The facility guards here are Gurkhas.
There is a Regional Reconstruction Team (PRT) (military) down the road, and a military airbase across the runway from the civilian terminal. The air base is run, primarily, by the Germans, though several countries, including the US, are represented there. We also passed a prison training facility on the way here from the airport. There is a lot of military and police facility training construction going on in this area. Huge areas adjacent to the military part of the airport are under construction, and other smaller ones out that direction in addition to the big prison project already mentioned.
This facility where I live is a square about 250 yards on each side. There is a wall of fence about 12 feet high with about 30 yards outside it until another shorter barbed wire fence. I do not know if that space is mined or not. On the other two sides is a space about the size of the compound in which expansion construction is taking place. There is so much military and police construction going on here that it seems likely that someone thinks we (the US) will be her for a while – at least in a training capacity.
The weather was cold at Kabul, and it was even colder at Mazar where it was also windy and hazy from dust. The cold remained through Wednesday (actually began warming Wed. PM), as I became familiar with the Mazar situation. It appears that the city is on a large plane that stretches North from the mountains toward the river that forms the countries boundry. It looks very green and fertile. The flat fields appear to be irrigated. Still, there is dust everywhere – a light film of fine dust is on everything.
The parts of the city that I have seen so far looks a little more prosperous than Jalalabad. There is more concrete (the gas station pump areas, for example) and there is a fair amount of housing construction going on which includes quite a few very large “villa” type homes. A building on the way to the Airport is about 10 stories high and is the tallest structure I have seen except for a row of grain elevators across the road from my compound. The streets are busy and the businesses appear to have customers. Ninety percent of the persons on the streets are men, and ninety percent of the women that are seen are wearing burkas.
I am receiving an email daily intelligence report now that I did not get before. It discloses that there is some insurgent activity in virtually every province but, by far, the most activity is in Kandahar and Hilmand. The Afghan New Year (also known as the Solar New Year and the Persian New year) began last Sunday, and many people from outside the province came here to visit the “Blue Mosque” in the city. Mazur is generally one of the most secure provinces, though there are thought to be bad quys in the mountains to the West who come to this area and do hostile things from time to time. The security forces are extra vigilant for the New Year. By security procedure, most of my vehicular movements require two vehicles. Our second one here is an old F-250 which blew a tire Thurs. We will have to now get it fixed. Since the Mazar city area is relatively secure, though, I’ll still be able to take care of most business with only the “hard car” Land Cruiser.
I met the CNAT team on Tuesday with the resident IA who then departed for R&R. He will be back in mid April – I’m on my own until then. On Thursday, Farmer’s day, the CNAT team went to a celebration that included some instruction to the local farmers about artificial insemination. The Dept. Of Agriculture is trying to use it as means of upgrading the local animal quality. They plan to furnish high quality semen to the local Vets and encourage the farmers to avail their animals. CNAT will take posters and hand outs to get their message out, but they wish they had been given enough notice to try to get funding for a TV set or a Washer which have proven to be a big hit for a “lucky farmer” drawing at these events.
About a quarter of a mile down the road from my compound is a Buzkashi stadium – a big dirt field with bleacher seats along one side. This is where they play the equestrian sport of Buskashi. It is rough. Some say that a good Buzkashi match makes Ultimate Fighting seem like a playground event. The game is composed of a bunch of guys on horses (a big big bunch – maybe a hundred) trying to grab the gutted carcass of a goat or calf (calves are preferred because they resist being torn to pieces better) and carrying it on some predetermined course( that I don’t quite understand) so as to deposit it at a kind of goal. The game goes on and on and on – in some places for days. There are dozens of randomly moving riders just seemingly having no purpose around the edges while the intense action is occurring out in the middle in a cloud of dust and a wild flurry of ongoing equestrian activity. Sometimes the calf carcass will fly up into the air – I don’t know if one guy is throwing it to another or if it is just a part of freeing it up. Once in a while the center of activity will move close enough to see the riders whipping and shoving and punching and grabbing at the carcass while their horses (a good one is extremely valuable) lunge and shove among each other to move to the carcass or to move powerfully away if their rider has a good grip. At one point an excited and partisan fan lunged into the fray and began lashing at one of the horses. He was promptly knocked on his ass and trampled – no one batted an eye – he escaped with only a slight limp. No prissy riding suites, shinny boots, or well brushed helmets here – though I’m told that the riders dress in sturdy cloths and heavy turbines to help absorb some of the punishment. It looks like a free for all bar fight on horseback, but they say that it actually involves a great deal of skill that takes years to learn (come to think of it, that might be true of free for all bar fighting too). Most of the super stars of the sport are guys in their late thirties or in their forties. It is probably a little late for me to become world-class at either Buzkashi or bar fighting. Oh, well, nothing can take away my dream of becoming a ballet dancer or a hip hop star. (the picture is from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/29/afghanistans_ultimate_sport) If you click on the picture, it should enlarge. You can see the carcass hanging down between the second and third horse from the left. I think the guy on the third horse presently has it, and the rider on the second is trying to take it away. The fifth rider is holding the one with the carcass from escaping to the left and the forthe guy is coming in to help one side or the other.Saturday, March 20, 2010
Jalalabad -- lessons learned
The picture in the heading is of a couple kids helping with the opium harvest. They score the poppy pods with a sharp implement and the poppy begins oozing opium – you can see it as a dark streak on the pod parallel to the stem. They come back later (as in the picture) and scrape it off with another tool – as the older child is doing. The dark stuff on the pods is opium as is the glob on the scraping tool.
Saturday and Sunday were uneventful. We went to Jalalabad Air Force Base (“JAF”)to work out at their Gym and eat at their cafeteria.
JAF is a huge installation that provides aviation services for this part of Afghanistan. Army helicopter of all descriptions are the aircraft most evident, but one also sees C-130s, King Air 200s, and Predator drones fairly frequently. I have seen no fighter aircraft. Down the road a mile or so is the Provincial Redevelopment Team (PRT). It, too, is a US military installation, but it is focused primarily on projects that advance the development of the province e.g., bridges, roads, irrigation, etc. The PRT also does counter narcotics public affairs ( PA) projects and provides PA materials, such as posters, balloons, tee shirts, etc., to CNAT for distribution. We use them in conjunction with the volleyball tournaments, football (soccer to us) matches, etc. The procedure is to stop all traffic while vehicles enter and leave these bases. This creates a large traffic problem. There is plenty of room to build a kind of ramp system to take vehicles off the road and feed them into the base gates, but this has not happened. The traffic just piles up day after day. Maybe someone should propose it as a AID project. I would certainly help facilitate commerce.
From the inside of a Land Cruiser, the town of Jalalabad is a great deal like Kabul in appearance, but there is much less traffic. Where there are spaces for sidewalks, there is mostly dirt. There are many pedestrians in the street along with the push carts, donkey carts, etc. Both Kabul and Jalalabad have far fewer motorcycles than I expected. While they are very plentiful in Thailand and even more so in Viet Nam, they are somewhat rare here. It seems to me that there are more bicycles in the streets than motorcycles. Only the main roads are paved. There is dust everywhere. Even where there is concrete or asphalt (rare except for road surface), it is covered with dust. The filling stations have gas pumps sticking up from dirt surfaces. When patrons show up for tea, the shopkeeper sweeps a spot on the concrete, or sweeps the dust from the hard packed dirt, for the customers to sit on.
This Jalalabad CNAT team is regarded as one of the most effective in the system. In addition to the training I am recieving from the resident IA I am, therefore, interviewing the CNAT team members, where possible, to try to ascertain what they think makes their team successful and how the IA’s can best contribute to the effort. These are some of the things I think they are trying to educate me about:
1. CULTURE Taylor your messages and project composition to the local situation. Be aware that Afghan culture is not Western culture. Here the beliefs and attitudes may differ markedly from valley to valley, even village to village, but they will all differ from those of a Westerner. Where education is highest, is where attitudes will be most flexible, but everywhere there will be some deep-rooted attitudes that must be taken into account. For example, Democracy in Afghanistan is often regarded as a system that encourages promiscuity – for better or worse that fact is very important. Further, it is seen as a system that gives as much weight to the opinion (and vote) of a degenerate, imbecile, or criminal as it does to a respected elder. The more educated the local people are, the more they will be willing to examine other characteristics, but they will also have a bit of that attitude. Maybe Democracy can not function properly until education is quite high. Meanwhile, plan your messages and projects within what is possible.
By the way, in the national election last fall, there were about 1.2 million persons who had voting cards – only 200,000 votes were cast. (I have not checked these figures)
2. LOCAL LEADERS The two most important persons in a community are the Mahlech (headman) and the Olemar/Moulah (religious leader). Try to make them a part of your efforts. The Mahleck position is usually familial – belongs to a prominent family. It would be very unusually for the Mahleck to be replace by a person from another family.
3. SURVEYS Periodically survey the communities and the districts for the purpose of determining what project and needed (and feasible). These surveys should be the basis for the formation of future plans – the development of project possibilities. Share the findings with other organizations (both governmental and NGO) so as to steer their efforts into productive channels and so as to get funding for deserving projects. Areas to look at are irrigation, electricity, access to media (esp. radio), drinking water, education, agriculture (better methods, crops, etc), PI possibilities (sporting events, Moulah (religious leader) counter narcotic training, developing good relationships with the media (explain our mission and request their support).
4. PLANNING. Based on the information above, have a plan for each CNAT division. Insist that the plan be reviewed regularly (probably weekly) as to A. work status and B. future goals. Here, at the weekly staff meeting, each division briefs what occurred during the past week and what they want/expect to do the following week – all within the context of an overall plan.
5. OPERATIONS Make sure each division has a plan (anual and weekly, more or less), that they know what the plan (and the plan’s purpose is), that they know what to do to implement the plan and, as security permits, THAT THEY SHOW UP, GET OUT OF THE OFFICE, AND DO THE WORK. This last was emphasized several times.
6. IA PROJECT VISITATIONS The IA’s benefit by having an understanding of what is happening in the field. As part of, #1, however, before going assess the effect on the project. IA’s are required to travel in body armor and with armed guards. In some situations this could seem to send the messages: A. we do not trust you; B. we are looking for a fight; and C. we feel immensely self important.
7. LIAISON AND FEEDBACK The IA’s provide a very useful function to the CNAT team by being a communications and advocacy link to the foreign entities that provide funding and other assistance. The are also the best source of feedback from these entities. IA’s need to remember to ask for this feedback and to pass it on to the team. If the team identifies a project which is handed off to one of the assistance agencies, the team needs to know if it becomes abandoned and why.
I returned to Kabul Thursday. Will fly to Mazar I Sharif (in the North) early Saturday morning in a funny looking Rusian fixed wing airplane. After a few day of familiarization, I will fill in there for the resident IA who is going on leave.
Saturday and Sunday were uneventful. We went to Jalalabad Air Force Base (“JAF”)to work out at their Gym and eat at their cafeteria.
JAF is a huge installation that provides aviation services for this part of Afghanistan. Army helicopter of all descriptions are the aircraft most evident, but one also sees C-130s, King Air 200s, and Predator drones fairly frequently. I have seen no fighter aircraft. Down the road a mile or so is the Provincial Redevelopment Team (PRT). It, too, is a US military installation, but it is focused primarily on projects that advance the development of the province e.g., bridges, roads, irrigation, etc. The PRT also does counter narcotics public affairs ( PA) projects and provides PA materials, such as posters, balloons, tee shirts, etc., to CNAT for distribution. We use them in conjunction with the volleyball tournaments, football (soccer to us) matches, etc. The procedure is to stop all traffic while vehicles enter and leave these bases. This creates a large traffic problem. There is plenty of room to build a kind of ramp system to take vehicles off the road and feed them into the base gates, but this has not happened. The traffic just piles up day after day. Maybe someone should propose it as a AID project. I would certainly help facilitate commerce.
From the inside of a Land Cruiser, the town of Jalalabad is a great deal like Kabul in appearance, but there is much less traffic. Where there are spaces for sidewalks, there is mostly dirt. There are many pedestrians in the street along with the push carts, donkey carts, etc. Both Kabul and Jalalabad have far fewer motorcycles than I expected. While they are very plentiful in Thailand and even more so in Viet Nam, they are somewhat rare here. It seems to me that there are more bicycles in the streets than motorcycles. Only the main roads are paved. There is dust everywhere. Even where there is concrete or asphalt (rare except for road surface), it is covered with dust. The filling stations have gas pumps sticking up from dirt surfaces. When patrons show up for tea, the shopkeeper sweeps a spot on the concrete, or sweeps the dust from the hard packed dirt, for the customers to sit on.
This Jalalabad CNAT team is regarded as one of the most effective in the system. In addition to the training I am recieving from the resident IA I am, therefore, interviewing the CNAT team members, where possible, to try to ascertain what they think makes their team successful and how the IA’s can best contribute to the effort. These are some of the things I think they are trying to educate me about:
1. CULTURE Taylor your messages and project composition to the local situation. Be aware that Afghan culture is not Western culture. Here the beliefs and attitudes may differ markedly from valley to valley, even village to village, but they will all differ from those of a Westerner. Where education is highest, is where attitudes will be most flexible, but everywhere there will be some deep-rooted attitudes that must be taken into account. For example, Democracy in Afghanistan is often regarded as a system that encourages promiscuity – for better or worse that fact is very important. Further, it is seen as a system that gives as much weight to the opinion (and vote) of a degenerate, imbecile, or criminal as it does to a respected elder. The more educated the local people are, the more they will be willing to examine other characteristics, but they will also have a bit of that attitude. Maybe Democracy can not function properly until education is quite high. Meanwhile, plan your messages and projects within what is possible.
By the way, in the national election last fall, there were about 1.2 million persons who had voting cards – only 200,000 votes were cast. (I have not checked these figures)
2. LOCAL LEADERS The two most important persons in a community are the Mahlech (headman) and the Olemar/Moulah (religious leader). Try to make them a part of your efforts. The Mahleck position is usually familial – belongs to a prominent family. It would be very unusually for the Mahleck to be replace by a person from another family.
3. SURVEYS Periodically survey the communities and the districts for the purpose of determining what project and needed (and feasible). These surveys should be the basis for the formation of future plans – the development of project possibilities. Share the findings with other organizations (both governmental and NGO) so as to steer their efforts into productive channels and so as to get funding for deserving projects. Areas to look at are irrigation, electricity, access to media (esp. radio), drinking water, education, agriculture (better methods, crops, etc), PI possibilities (sporting events, Moulah (religious leader) counter narcotic training, developing good relationships with the media (explain our mission and request their support).
4. PLANNING. Based on the information above, have a plan for each CNAT division. Insist that the plan be reviewed regularly (probably weekly) as to A. work status and B. future goals. Here, at the weekly staff meeting, each division briefs what occurred during the past week and what they want/expect to do the following week – all within the context of an overall plan.
5. OPERATIONS Make sure each division has a plan (anual and weekly, more or less), that they know what the plan (and the plan’s purpose is), that they know what to do to implement the plan and, as security permits, THAT THEY SHOW UP, GET OUT OF THE OFFICE, AND DO THE WORK. This last was emphasized several times.
6. IA PROJECT VISITATIONS The IA’s benefit by having an understanding of what is happening in the field. As part of, #1, however, before going assess the effect on the project. IA’s are required to travel in body armor and with armed guards. In some situations this could seem to send the messages: A. we do not trust you; B. we are looking for a fight; and C. we feel immensely self important.
7. LIAISON AND FEEDBACK The IA’s provide a very useful function to the CNAT team by being a communications and advocacy link to the foreign entities that provide funding and other assistance. The are also the best source of feedback from these entities. IA’s need to remember to ask for this feedback and to pass it on to the team. If the team identifies a project which is handed off to one of the assistance agencies, the team needs to know if it becomes abandoned and why.
I returned to Kabul Thursday. Will fly to Mazar I Sharif (in the North) early Saturday morning in a funny looking Rusian fixed wing airplane. After a few day of familiarization, I will fill in there for the resident IA who is going on leave.
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