I apologize for neglecting my updates. There should be a way to notify interested persons when a new post is published (so you don't have to come to an empty site), but I have been unable to find one. I just spent another 45 minutes researching the topic and came up with this: "use Feedburner to manage the subscriptions. Blogger automatically comes with an RSS feed provider - just get them to click on the envelope on the screen and give their email address. They'll then be sent all new posts done by you." I have no idea, however, what it means and/or how to use it. If anyone reading this uses it and can explain it, please comment.
I am still pursuing the possibility of going back to Afghanistan, but I have nothing concrete yet. If it happens, I'll continue the reporting of that venture. If not, I may just close the blog. Alternatively, I think it might be interesting to present some opinions for debate -- there are a number of popular attitudes and opinions that I just cannot relate go. I can not, for example, understand why so many persons believe that it is a morally superior position to allow friends and fellow citizens to vaporize or die of Ebola rather that to water board a scumbag into disclosing the location of a terror device. Anyway, let me sort things out, and I'll try to get the posts going again soon.
The situation is Thailand is calm, but the underlying problems are still there.
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Afghan Closeout Report
The James Stent piece has generated more interest by far than anything else I have provided over the past five months. I will try to follow up but, sorry to say, I don’t know much about Mr. Stent except that the email I received that contained his piece said he was a long time Thai resident. I have no idea how to contact him. I do, however, have some news about him -- provided today by Andrew Dover in a comment to that part of this blog: http://www.zoominfo.com/people/Stent_James_61720833.aspx Mr Dover has provided links to other writings about the Thai situation too. Take a look.
Meanwhile, it appears that my stint in Afghanistan has come to an end. I was very hopeful that, by reactivating my law license, I would get picked up for the JSSP program (administered by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)). I knew that they have applicants who have serious experience as prosecutors, defense attorneys and, even, judges. I hoped, however, that the fact that I had worked in Afghanistan might be a strong enough factor to make me a candidate. Apparently not – they have my application, but no one has contacted me.
As a kind of close-out of the Afghanistan venture, I will answer some of the questions that have come up about what I saw there and/or think about the situation.
1. Are we winning? I am not optimistic. Winning would mean making large Afghan areas secure and leaving them an a way that the Afghans could keep secure. This war is being fought in a new way that now focuses (more than ever before) on avoiding civilian casualties above all else. The Brits, Canadians, and Americans are the only forces that, more or less, want to fight, and they are approaching the enemy in a very mild manner. The rules of engagement (ROE) have evolved to the point that there is actually a policy directive ordering troops to patrol only in areas where they are reasonably sure they will not contact the enemy (see my McChrystal comments below). There is widespread dissatisfaction among the troops with the ROE and with the progress of the war generally. If this new approach were resulting in security, I might have some hope but, as far as I can see, it is not. We are not killing very many Talaban nor disrupting them in a way that leaves them ineffective. There are not very many Afghans that want the Talaban to be in control, but they have little confidence that we will make them secure. They believe that, when we leave, the Taliban will still be there and that they will be vengeful toward those who were too enthusiastic about supporting us. They are trying to accept our aid in a way that the Talaban approve. Getting approval for aid projects from the Tanaban leadership, paying a percentage of the salaries they receive for working on aid projects to the Talaban, etc. We are training a large number of police and soldiers, but the trainers I talked to are not very confident of their readiness or commitment. Our attempt to get the Afghans ready to provide their own security seems neither efficient or effective. Overlaying the whole problem is our reliance on a central government that is corrupt and ineffective. Here and there is a success story (see my piece a few weeks ago about Balkh Province poppy cultivation success which applies to their security success as well), but those success stories seem to me to be little headed. Mostly it appears to me to be a frantic attempt to buy an effective government and security force in a short time. My sense is that we might have them ready to car for themselves in three or four years – by next summer, no hope.
2. How much do contractors get paid? This varies quite a bit. They start with a base salary that seems to be close to what the same job might be paid in the US at the Federal level and they add 35% danger pay for the days in Afghanistan and another 35% post deferential pay (a kind of hardship bonus) which continues unless you are out of country for a certain time during the contract (mine was 30 continuous days). They also add a 10% contract bonus if you finish the years contract and (at least in my case) a bit of money to defray travel expense for the R&R type leave you get (usually about two weeks R&R after about eight weeks work. All these add ons boost the pay about 80% above the base pay. It is a sum that can never be achieved (because you will never have been in country for all 365 days) but it is, for some reason the amount that every one talks about. My pay was typical for mentor or advisor and the amount was roughly ($96,000 base). The Border Patrol training position that I was offered with a different company paid $134,000 (including add ons), The lawyers in the Justice System Support Program are working from a base of around $110,000 which puts the total possible compensation around $200,000. The aviators are compensated a little differently. They get approximately $600 - $700 per day, and the ones I know about work in country for about 60 days with compensation and then have about 30 days off without pay. This puts their annual compensation up around $155,000 with about 4 months off. I think they can choose to work more, but I’m not sure. Meanwhile what I would call project managers are paid around $210,000 total with add ons. I assume that program managers that oversee several projects are 10% or so north of that figure. One of the attractive features of all these contractor positions is the fact that lodging and food are furnished at no cost so there is very little in-country expense to the employee, and most of the compensation can be utilized by the employee. In Afghanistan, the contracts are “alcohol free” and, while it is possible to find a place to drink in Kabul, very little money is spent on that kind of entertainment. There is also an income tax break. In that these salaries are paid for services performed outside the USA and it’s territories, there is up to about $90,000 per year that can be excluded from US income tax if the employee qualifies. To qualify, the employee must 1. Be a resident of a foreign country or 2. Be outside the USA for about 330 days of the 365 in which the employment is contained.
3. What’s going on with the McChrystal flap? I just now went back and reread the Rolling Stone article that precipitated the controversy and McChrystal removal. The “Runaway General” article that reportedly demonstrated ’s McChrystal’s disrespect for his civilian bosses. I am still a little puzzled. Maybe I have become jaded, but I can not find anything in the article that would seem to provoke more that a reprimand. Here are the “disrespectful” items (let me know what I missed): 1. McChrystal voiced dismay at having to dine with a French diplomat; 2. Last fall McChrystal said he thought Biden’s strategy was “short sighted;” 3. McChrystal thought Obama was “uncomfortable and intimidated” by a room full of Military flag officers (this was a year or so ago); 4. An aid characterized McChrystal’s meeting with Obama as a ten minute photo op, said Obama knew little about McCheyatal, and stated that McChrystal was disappointed with the meeting (this also was at least eight months ago); 5. McChrystal found the three month wait for Obama’s decision about a troop increase “painful;” 6. McChrystal characterized the Maja military operation (which he constructed and oversaw) as “a bleeding ulcer;” 7. An aid called Jim Jones a “clown.” This is quite serious, but not at all the same as if McChrystal had said it or if it had been said about the president; 7. McChrystal described Holbrooke as “like a wounded animal” and was reluctant to take phone calls from him; 8.McChrystal’s relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry is strained and, to Eikenberry’s dismay, McChrystal did not appoint the Ambassador as the Afghan Viceroy – McChrystal felt “betrayed” by an Eikenberry memo which was critical of the counter insurgency plan; 9. An aid says that, if the American public really paid attention to the war, there would be even less support; 10. The diplomatic community feels that McChrystal has usurped duties that are properly handled by diplomats. This is an overlay for the strained relationship with Eikenberry and Holbrooke. However, McChrystal has the support of the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. That is a really big “however” when you are talking about conducting foreign diplomacy. In sum, the most pronounced problem is that McChrystal is at odds with the involved diplomats, except the one that really counts, the Secretary of State. He has been successful in being the prime mover in US-Afghan diplomatic events. True, he and his aids have said some “bitchy” things about their civilian bosses, but all these have been pretty typical of subordinate’s private remarks in all organizations. The most disrespectfully, in my opinion, being the “clown” remark about Gen. Jones and the dim-witted remarks about the Vice President. I guess, in sum, it is disrespectful, but it seems to me to fall short of insubordination. I certainly is not akin to moving to invade a neighboring country or refusal to follow orders. However it is characterized, it seems to me to provides little support for the headline Runaway General” and none at all for the sub heading asserting his attitude that “...the real enemy [are] the wimps in the White House.” It looks to me as though everyone has taken these two bogus headings as a valid summation of the entire affair without much real analysis. Joe Klien, in Time magazine, calls McChrystal’s gaff as a “crushing indelicacy” and the Bankok Post editor said McChrystal “criticized and even ridiculed President Barack Obama.” I’ll sign on for indelicacy but see nothing crushing about it nor do I see it as ridiculing the President. Different folks see things differently, I guess.
In my view, the article documents, much more clearly, that the counter insurgence policy (called COIN) is not successful in Afghanistan. COIN endeavors to put soldiers throughout the communities so as to disrupt and make ineffective the insurgents while making the every day life of the population secure – a kind of community policing approach with heavier weapons. It also involves help in building the community infrastructure and governmental apparatus. COIN is the brainchild, primarily, of Gen. Petraeus, and it was a part of his success in Iraq. It has always involved a conscious effort to avoid civilian casualties, but COIN, as practiced under McChrystal, has come to be an avoid armed conflict approach as well as an avoid civilian harm approach. It is not uprooting the Taliban nor making the citizens feel secure. The article also discloses that the troops that are implementing this COIN approach in Afghanistan are very unhappy about it. They do not think it is effective and they think it exposes them to purposeless risk. COIN may (or may not) be a faithful reflection of White House philosophy, but it is being conducted by McChrystal, and it is presently not at all successful.
Anyway, that is my take. A very interesting question to me is why McChrystal would ever cause an openly ruthless left wing reporter, who reports for a left wing publication, to have many weeks of close access. This reporter, Michael Hastings, is on the record as regarding his job to be to f..... news sources in the process of getting stories. He is also known to be left leaning and the Rolling Stone is universally regarded as a leftist publication with no real kinship with the military. McChrystal and his staff are smart, alert, and analytical – this story did not happen by mistake. I can not believe that they were blind sided. There is no doubt in my mind that they facilitated the article for some purpose, and I think they absolutely had to have expected a story from this reporter similar to the one they received. They had to expect that any and all conflicts, mistakes, calamities, and failure would be reported. At the same time, they clearly know that the counterinsurgency is not going well, that the diplomats regard McChrystal as overreaching, that McChrystal is regarded as a staunch supporter of Afghan president Karzai (who’s government is widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective), and that these facts would be reported along with whatever else the reporter discovered. The question then becomes, why would McCrystal want this Rolling Stone article to come about? Almost every leader in every organization devises measures to cover, obscure, or explain the kind of things Hastings wrote about. Why would this leader want them publicly aired? What was McChrystal’s objective? I can see two possibilities: 1. He wanted to expose the situation in an attempt to move the policy in a different direction and/or 2. He wanted to extradite himself from a failing situation. A friend of mine thinks McChryatal is “falling on his sword” so as to change policy. That could be -- and, maybe, he did not expect the reaction to be so extreme. A less kind speculation would be that he wants to remove himself from a mess that he cannot clean up without seeming to “quit.” My guess is that it is mostly number 1, but that number 2 provides a background incentive and makes it more palatable. Are there other possibilities?
4. What are the Afghan people like? What I will describe is based on my limited associations – mostly with the CNAT team members and the Afghan security team.
They are pretty much like people everywhere in that they love their families, want to make life better for their children, want to have good jobs, want security, and wish for peace. They are members of a culture with different underlying presumptions and beliefs than ours. They are most comfortable with local government, respectful of their elders, and deferential to their leaders. They welcome individual input to governmental decisions but are not enthusiastic about our concept of Democracy. Once there is a consensus about community policy, they mostly turn in that direction and support the policy. They think it is silly to give the same weight to the opinion (vote) of a criminal, pervert, or moron as to a respected elder. They associate Western Democracy with promiscuity. They are religious and that religion is Islam, but they think the Taliban have become well outside what the Koran teaches. They mostly support education and business opportunity for all, but they think there are clearly different family and community rolls for men and women. Their marriages are almost all arraigned by their parents and other senior family member, and a very high percentage of those marriages are successful.
5. Why was CNAT and CPI thrown on the trash heap so abruptly? I can only give a reasoned speculation.
Remember that CPI was alerted in mid April to expect a contact extension until next February but, about ten days later, was formally notified that the program would shut down in approximately eight weeks. The CNAT program itself was doing what it was designed to do, though the precise criteria against which it would be evaluated were never established – and it did those things very efficiently. Partly because of this lack of clear performance criteria for the program and the personnel therein, a tension had developed between the Dept. of State INL program manager(s) and the CPI leadership, but the program was limping along although there were a few open conflicts.
Here is what I think happened. There is only one event that I am aware of that occurred within, or around, that ten day period between “extend” and “terminate” that could have changed the INL attitude so drastically. That was the establishment of a narcotics usage and rehabilitation study in Balkh province. The senior International Advisor (IA) in Balk (I was the junior IA there) was the prime mover in the formation of this study. He clearly believed it was worthwhile, but it was also in direct contravention of the specific direction of the INL program manger – a reminder of which had been sent by email just a couple weeks before the formation of the study. I do not believe in coincidence, and my speculation is that the INL program manager used this as a kind of loose cannon argument to contend that CPI and CNAT were beyond control and should be shut down.
This is my own conjecture. I have no certain knowledge. But that is the only event that I know of that could have prompted such a drastic change in position. It is a tragedy! The CNAT program should be studied and emulated rather than ended. The CNAT model allowed the funding to bypass most of the corruption fund diversion opportunities that allow so much aid money to be funneled off. It was able to deliver aid projects, as an example, for about 30% of comparable project costs. If CNAT it had been properly established, with clear performance criteria and some SOP's rather than open ended objectives, it could have achieved US counter narcotic policy objectives very precisely, in my humble opinion.
Meanwhile, it appears that my stint in Afghanistan has come to an end. I was very hopeful that, by reactivating my law license, I would get picked up for the JSSP program (administered by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE)). I knew that they have applicants who have serious experience as prosecutors, defense attorneys and, even, judges. I hoped, however, that the fact that I had worked in Afghanistan might be a strong enough factor to make me a candidate. Apparently not – they have my application, but no one has contacted me.
As a kind of close-out of the Afghanistan venture, I will answer some of the questions that have come up about what I saw there and/or think about the situation.
1. Are we winning? I am not optimistic. Winning would mean making large Afghan areas secure and leaving them an a way that the Afghans could keep secure. This war is being fought in a new way that now focuses (more than ever before) on avoiding civilian casualties above all else. The Brits, Canadians, and Americans are the only forces that, more or less, want to fight, and they are approaching the enemy in a very mild manner. The rules of engagement (ROE) have evolved to the point that there is actually a policy directive ordering troops to patrol only in areas where they are reasonably sure they will not contact the enemy (see my McChrystal comments below). There is widespread dissatisfaction among the troops with the ROE and with the progress of the war generally. If this new approach were resulting in security, I might have some hope but, as far as I can see, it is not. We are not killing very many Talaban nor disrupting them in a way that leaves them ineffective. There are not very many Afghans that want the Talaban to be in control, but they have little confidence that we will make them secure. They believe that, when we leave, the Taliban will still be there and that they will be vengeful toward those who were too enthusiastic about supporting us. They are trying to accept our aid in a way that the Talaban approve. Getting approval for aid projects from the Tanaban leadership, paying a percentage of the salaries they receive for working on aid projects to the Talaban, etc. We are training a large number of police and soldiers, but the trainers I talked to are not very confident of their readiness or commitment. Our attempt to get the Afghans ready to provide their own security seems neither efficient or effective. Overlaying the whole problem is our reliance on a central government that is corrupt and ineffective. Here and there is a success story (see my piece a few weeks ago about Balkh Province poppy cultivation success which applies to their security success as well), but those success stories seem to me to be little headed. Mostly it appears to me to be a frantic attempt to buy an effective government and security force in a short time. My sense is that we might have them ready to car for themselves in three or four years – by next summer, no hope.
2. How much do contractors get paid? This varies quite a bit. They start with a base salary that seems to be close to what the same job might be paid in the US at the Federal level and they add 35% danger pay for the days in Afghanistan and another 35% post deferential pay (a kind of hardship bonus) which continues unless you are out of country for a certain time during the contract (mine was 30 continuous days). They also add a 10% contract bonus if you finish the years contract and (at least in my case) a bit of money to defray travel expense for the R&R type leave you get (usually about two weeks R&R after about eight weeks work. All these add ons boost the pay about 80% above the base pay. It is a sum that can never be achieved (because you will never have been in country for all 365 days) but it is, for some reason the amount that every one talks about. My pay was typical for mentor or advisor and the amount was roughly ($96,000 base). The Border Patrol training position that I was offered with a different company paid $134,000 (including add ons), The lawyers in the Justice System Support Program are working from a base of around $110,000 which puts the total possible compensation around $200,000. The aviators are compensated a little differently. They get approximately $600 - $700 per day, and the ones I know about work in country for about 60 days with compensation and then have about 30 days off without pay. This puts their annual compensation up around $155,000 with about 4 months off. I think they can choose to work more, but I’m not sure. Meanwhile what I would call project managers are paid around $210,000 total with add ons. I assume that program managers that oversee several projects are 10% or so north of that figure. One of the attractive features of all these contractor positions is the fact that lodging and food are furnished at no cost so there is very little in-country expense to the employee, and most of the compensation can be utilized by the employee. In Afghanistan, the contracts are “alcohol free” and, while it is possible to find a place to drink in Kabul, very little money is spent on that kind of entertainment. There is also an income tax break. In that these salaries are paid for services performed outside the USA and it’s territories, there is up to about $90,000 per year that can be excluded from US income tax if the employee qualifies. To qualify, the employee must 1. Be a resident of a foreign country or 2. Be outside the USA for about 330 days of the 365 in which the employment is contained.
3. What’s going on with the McChrystal flap? I just now went back and reread the Rolling Stone article that precipitated the controversy and McChrystal removal. The “Runaway General” article that reportedly demonstrated ’s McChrystal’s disrespect for his civilian bosses. I am still a little puzzled. Maybe I have become jaded, but I can not find anything in the article that would seem to provoke more that a reprimand. Here are the “disrespectful” items (let me know what I missed): 1. McChrystal voiced dismay at having to dine with a French diplomat; 2. Last fall McChrystal said he thought Biden’s strategy was “short sighted;” 3. McChrystal thought Obama was “uncomfortable and intimidated” by a room full of Military flag officers (this was a year or so ago); 4. An aid characterized McChrystal’s meeting with Obama as a ten minute photo op, said Obama knew little about McCheyatal, and stated that McChrystal was disappointed with the meeting (this also was at least eight months ago); 5. McChrystal found the three month wait for Obama’s decision about a troop increase “painful;” 6. McChrystal characterized the Maja military operation (which he constructed and oversaw) as “a bleeding ulcer;” 7. An aid called Jim Jones a “clown.” This is quite serious, but not at all the same as if McChrystal had said it or if it had been said about the president; 7. McChrystal described Holbrooke as “like a wounded animal” and was reluctant to take phone calls from him; 8.McChrystal’s relationship with Ambassador Eikenberry is strained and, to Eikenberry’s dismay, McChrystal did not appoint the Ambassador as the Afghan Viceroy – McChrystal felt “betrayed” by an Eikenberry memo which was critical of the counter insurgency plan; 9. An aid says that, if the American public really paid attention to the war, there would be even less support; 10. The diplomatic community feels that McChrystal has usurped duties that are properly handled by diplomats. This is an overlay for the strained relationship with Eikenberry and Holbrooke. However, McChrystal has the support of the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton. That is a really big “however” when you are talking about conducting foreign diplomacy. In sum, the most pronounced problem is that McChrystal is at odds with the involved diplomats, except the one that really counts, the Secretary of State. He has been successful in being the prime mover in US-Afghan diplomatic events. True, he and his aids have said some “bitchy” things about their civilian bosses, but all these have been pretty typical of subordinate’s private remarks in all organizations. The most disrespectfully, in my opinion, being the “clown” remark about Gen. Jones and the dim-witted remarks about the Vice President. I guess, in sum, it is disrespectful, but it seems to me to fall short of insubordination. I certainly is not akin to moving to invade a neighboring country or refusal to follow orders. However it is characterized, it seems to me to provides little support for the headline Runaway General” and none at all for the sub heading asserting his attitude that “...the real enemy [are] the wimps in the White House.” It looks to me as though everyone has taken these two bogus headings as a valid summation of the entire affair without much real analysis. Joe Klien, in Time magazine, calls McChrystal’s gaff as a “crushing indelicacy” and the Bankok Post editor said McChrystal “criticized and even ridiculed President Barack Obama.” I’ll sign on for indelicacy but see nothing crushing about it nor do I see it as ridiculing the President. Different folks see things differently, I guess.
In my view, the article documents, much more clearly, that the counter insurgence policy (called COIN) is not successful in Afghanistan. COIN endeavors to put soldiers throughout the communities so as to disrupt and make ineffective the insurgents while making the every day life of the population secure – a kind of community policing approach with heavier weapons. It also involves help in building the community infrastructure and governmental apparatus. COIN is the brainchild, primarily, of Gen. Petraeus, and it was a part of his success in Iraq. It has always involved a conscious effort to avoid civilian casualties, but COIN, as practiced under McChrystal, has come to be an avoid armed conflict approach as well as an avoid civilian harm approach. It is not uprooting the Taliban nor making the citizens feel secure. The article also discloses that the troops that are implementing this COIN approach in Afghanistan are very unhappy about it. They do not think it is effective and they think it exposes them to purposeless risk. COIN may (or may not) be a faithful reflection of White House philosophy, but it is being conducted by McChrystal, and it is presently not at all successful.
Anyway, that is my take. A very interesting question to me is why McChrystal would ever cause an openly ruthless left wing reporter, who reports for a left wing publication, to have many weeks of close access. This reporter, Michael Hastings, is on the record as regarding his job to be to f..... news sources in the process of getting stories. He is also known to be left leaning and the Rolling Stone is universally regarded as a leftist publication with no real kinship with the military. McChrystal and his staff are smart, alert, and analytical – this story did not happen by mistake. I can not believe that they were blind sided. There is no doubt in my mind that they facilitated the article for some purpose, and I think they absolutely had to have expected a story from this reporter similar to the one they received. They had to expect that any and all conflicts, mistakes, calamities, and failure would be reported. At the same time, they clearly know that the counterinsurgency is not going well, that the diplomats regard McChrystal as overreaching, that McChrystal is regarded as a staunch supporter of Afghan president Karzai (who’s government is widely regarded as corrupt and ineffective), and that these facts would be reported along with whatever else the reporter discovered. The question then becomes, why would McCrystal want this Rolling Stone article to come about? Almost every leader in every organization devises measures to cover, obscure, or explain the kind of things Hastings wrote about. Why would this leader want them publicly aired? What was McChrystal’s objective? I can see two possibilities: 1. He wanted to expose the situation in an attempt to move the policy in a different direction and/or 2. He wanted to extradite himself from a failing situation. A friend of mine thinks McChryatal is “falling on his sword” so as to change policy. That could be -- and, maybe, he did not expect the reaction to be so extreme. A less kind speculation would be that he wants to remove himself from a mess that he cannot clean up without seeming to “quit.” My guess is that it is mostly number 1, but that number 2 provides a background incentive and makes it more palatable. Are there other possibilities?
4. What are the Afghan people like? What I will describe is based on my limited associations – mostly with the CNAT team members and the Afghan security team.
They are pretty much like people everywhere in that they love their families, want to make life better for their children, want to have good jobs, want security, and wish for peace. They are members of a culture with different underlying presumptions and beliefs than ours. They are most comfortable with local government, respectful of their elders, and deferential to their leaders. They welcome individual input to governmental decisions but are not enthusiastic about our concept of Democracy. Once there is a consensus about community policy, they mostly turn in that direction and support the policy. They think it is silly to give the same weight to the opinion (vote) of a criminal, pervert, or moron as to a respected elder. They associate Western Democracy with promiscuity. They are religious and that religion is Islam, but they think the Taliban have become well outside what the Koran teaches. They mostly support education and business opportunity for all, but they think there are clearly different family and community rolls for men and women. Their marriages are almost all arraigned by their parents and other senior family member, and a very high percentage of those marriages are successful.
5. Why was CNAT and CPI thrown on the trash heap so abruptly? I can only give a reasoned speculation.
Remember that CPI was alerted in mid April to expect a contact extension until next February but, about ten days later, was formally notified that the program would shut down in approximately eight weeks. The CNAT program itself was doing what it was designed to do, though the precise criteria against which it would be evaluated were never established – and it did those things very efficiently. Partly because of this lack of clear performance criteria for the program and the personnel therein, a tension had developed between the Dept. of State INL program manager(s) and the CPI leadership, but the program was limping along although there were a few open conflicts.
Here is what I think happened. There is only one event that I am aware of that occurred within, or around, that ten day period between “extend” and “terminate” that could have changed the INL attitude so drastically. That was the establishment of a narcotics usage and rehabilitation study in Balkh province. The senior International Advisor (IA) in Balk (I was the junior IA there) was the prime mover in the formation of this study. He clearly believed it was worthwhile, but it was also in direct contravention of the specific direction of the INL program manger – a reminder of which had been sent by email just a couple weeks before the formation of the study. I do not believe in coincidence, and my speculation is that the INL program manager used this as a kind of loose cannon argument to contend that CPI and CNAT were beyond control and should be shut down.
This is my own conjecture. I have no certain knowledge. But that is the only event that I know of that could have prompted such a drastic change in position. It is a tragedy! The CNAT program should be studied and emulated rather than ended. The CNAT model allowed the funding to bypass most of the corruption fund diversion opportunities that allow so much aid money to be funneled off. It was able to deliver aid projects, as an example, for about 30% of comparable project costs. If CNAT it had been properly established, with clear performance criteria and some SOP's rather than open ended objectives, it could have achieved US counter narcotic policy objectives very precisely, in my humble opinion.
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