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Updated each Friday (more or less)

Sunday, April 25, 2010

Late Post -- Thailand Red Shirt Crisis -- end of CNAT

The past couple weeks have been hectic. I just could not seem to get around to posting this. Yesterday, I was informed that the State Department has cancelled the contract that I am working under – as of the end of June. Actually, they have decided not to extend the “temporary” work order under which we have been functioning. CPI has never had a proper contract – just performing under a repeatedly extended work order for the past two years or so. The work order has been extended every few months with a promise that a proper contract will be awarded down the line. They, apparently, have decided to simply scrap the CNAT program. Meanwhile, CPI is bidding on some other Afghan contracts. If they are awarded one that contains a position for which I am qualified, I hope to be able to just slide into the new position. This, however, is speculation on my part. I am returning to Kabul tomorrow (Monday) from Thailand, and I will find out then if I have any options. It could be that I will simply have worked for only four months – not nearly enough time to buy the Gulfstream executive jet that I’ve had my heart set on.


Back to the past two weeks:

Please try to read the Time magazine article last week about the problems a US Army company has had in just trying to reopen an Afghan school. It is illustrative of the bureaucratic and other troubles that occur with many, probably most, of the potential aid projects in Afghanistan. It demonstrates that the Afghan citizens have to deal with the reality that America and her allies may not have eliminated the Taliban nor have trained an effective security force before they leave. See: www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1982093,00.html

Acquiring an airline ticket in Afghanistan has proven to be an ordeal. Not the acquisition itself, but having any choice of itinerary or seating. I tried two different travel agencies and discovered that it is pretty much a one choice take it or leave it proposition. If you inquire about alternative itineraries it turns into a situation where what you were offered gets cancelled with no other options having been offered. Ask about a seat assignment and you are informed that you will be allotted a seat at the airport. Push the issue and you may lose your reservation. Once you have a reservation number, you can call the airline and they will assign you a seat, but you will likely have to pay (cash) for the ticket before you get a reservation number. The only good thing about the process is that they can get you a significantly better fare than you can find on the internet.

I was deposited into Bangkok at the height (so far) of the Thailand Red Shirt political crisis. There were nearly 30 people killed at a demonstration that got out of control a couple weeks ago and, the day before I arrived, an RPG was fired into a Sky Train station killing a bystander. A couple days ago the Red Shirts stormed the Chulalongkorn University Hospital searching for someone. Today there is a cabinet meeting at which the government will discuss the imposition of martial law. The Red Shirts are supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1108114.stm
Thaksin is now a self-exiled, felony-convicted fugitive billionaire who is providing financial support to the Red Shirts and whipping them up with big-screen televised speeches at their rallies. He is a talented and chiasmatic politician that the poor and rural people see as the only political leader who has instituted political measures specifically to help them. He instituted some long overdue and needed populist reforms (which some opponent see as a step toward Communism). The fact that he moved political corruption and self benefit to a level that was previously unimaginable, seems to make little difference to his supporters. “Sure he is a crook, but they are all crooks – and he is the only crook that helped make my life better” seems to be the attitude.

Thaksin was ousted by a military coup about three and a half years ago. The military proved to be inept at governing and relinquished control a year or so ago to what has evolved into the present government. This present government is, however, is widely regarded as being manipulated by the military and, though the Prime Minister seems to be regarded as non-corrupt, his administration appears to me to be populated by ineffective and dishonest bureaucrats. The Hmong debacle four months ago provides a good example that I am familiar with:

 No one doubts that the vast majority of the 4500 or so Hmong that were repatriated to Laos were “economic” migrants just seeking a better life, but it is a clear fact that, among this large group, there were a substantial number of what has come to be called the “Jungle Hmong” who’s repatriation would subject them to almost certain harsh treatment, likely torture, and possible execution. Instead of just sorting the Jungle Hmong from the rest – a classification task that had already pretty much been done by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Thai military screeners – the Thai government separated the potential leaders from the large group but delivered everyone across the Mekong to the Lao authorities. Meanwhile, the Prime and the Foreign Minister blatantly and repeatedly told the public that:

1. The repatriation was voluntary,

2. All the refugees were of an economic nature, and

3. That there was an intergovernmental agreement that would guarantee good treatment of the refugees by the Lao officials (the specific terms of this “agreement” were A. never disclosed, B. were, apparently, never reduced to writing, and C. have no provisions for monitoring and/or verification. I can find no record of any other non defense related agreement between governments that has these characteristics). It seems evident that the “agreement” was (if it even ever existed) a vague verbal understanding between officials that, if they even had the authority, never bothered to do what is customary to move the understanding beyond a conjectural possibility.  None of these items, presented by the government officals were true.

The bottom line is that the present Thai government was blatantly dishonest about this particular issue that I care about, so it is reasonable to suspect that they have behaved in a similarly unscrupulous manner on other issues.  That is my personal assessment of the present governmental situation, based on this one specific issue that interests me as well as my general observation of ineptitude.  As I write this, the present government is asserting that some leaders of the Red Shirts are anti Monarchist. If there is any one thing that almost all Thais feel strongly about it is their common love for this King. Any believed suggestion of an anti Monarchist sentiment is likely to provoke large numbers of Thai citizens to blind outrage. This was proven in the fall of 1976 when dozens of Thai students were slaughtered by a group of Thai citizens who (erroneously) believed those students to be against the King. Based on the observations related above, you can likely guess that I am skeptical about these present charges.

A little more than a year ago, it was the Yellow Shirt group that demonstrated and shut down the BKK airport. They are the group that, generally, support the present government and are staunchly anti Thaksin. Last week a Multi Colored Shirt group was formed and held a couple large rallies to protest the disruption and economic harm that the other two main groups are causing. Everyone hopes that this lovely country and it’s delightful people can find a way to come together. Presently, however, it appears that the two main factions are becoming more hard-nosed and more militant. 

Last week the US Embassy hosted a town hall meeting to give advice about the situation. The advice they had was good even if, mostly, self evident. 1. Stay way from the demonstration areas, 2. Remember that you are not the target of the protests, 3. If you find yourself in a demonstration, be polite and move away from it, and 4. Have 72 hours of provisions and water at home in case you become isolated (good general advice in case of hurricanes, earthquakes, etc. too).

The Ambassador was charming and answered questions for about 40 minutes. One young man who sad he was a professional photographer who visits the Red Shirt area every day said the numbers of the Red Shirts are vastly underestimated. He asserted that the official estimation of 50,000 in the area is low by a factor of three or four. The Ambassador was skeptical. He said they are paying close attention and believe the official estimate is accurate.

After the formal meeting ended, the Ambassador was asked if anyone at the Embassy knows what has become of the heads of the families of the former US allies, the repatriated Jungle Hmong group. He seemed mildly surprised by the question and quickly stated something about not being able to talk about some things, but that the Embassy is monitoring the situation. He said they have learned that one cannot believe what the Laos say (what a startling revelation that must have been!). My prediction is that the Jungle Hmong adult males have already been “disappeared.” If there is ever any Lao statement about them it will be that they escaped back to the jungle. The rest will be disbursed around the country, Thailand will receive the bulk of the upcoming Lao hydroelectric kilowatts and investment benefits, and our US State Department will suck up to the Communist so as to expand the Lao American Embassy staff.

That’s it for now. Back to Kabul tomorrow, via Delhi. I’m anxious to see if I have a future employment possibility beyond the next two months and what the next two months will present as we shut down the program. It will be potentially devastating news for the Afghan CNAT team members and the Security team to learn that their program is ending – along with their jobs.

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